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 This dissertation examines corporate use of derivative instruments and multi-period 
hedging methods.  It studies the use of linear (e.g. futures) and nonlinear (e.g. options) 
derivatives in a sample of 382 U.S. non-financial firms (920 firm-year observations) between 
1992 and 1996.  It also measures the performance of stacked hedge techniques with applications 
to three investment assets (heating oil, light crude oil, and unleaded gasoline) and to three 
commercial commodities (British Pound, Deutsche Mark, and Swiss Franc).   In a stacked hedge, 
corporations hedge the long-term exposures by repeatedly rolling nearby futures contracts until 
settlement.  
  Analyzing the 382 firms, I find that both value maximization and managerial incentives 
explain the use of linear and nonlinear derivatives by corporations.  In particular, the use of 
nonlinear instruments is positively related to the firm’s investment opportunities, size, free cash 
flow, prospect of financial distress, and managerial option grants.  Firms are more likely to use 
derivative contracts with linear payoffs when their CEOs receive more compensation from bonus 
compensation or have been in their positions for longer periods of time.    
  I evaluate how well long-term exposures to asset prices can be neutralized using stacked 
hedge techniques with applications to investment assets and to commodities.  My evidence 
suggests that stacked hedges perform better with investment assets than with commercial 
commodities.  The stacked hedge produces hedge performance of at least 0.98 for investment 
assets and hedge performance of less than 0.83 for heating oil.  The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that a stochastic representation of convenience yields results in pronounced 










Recent surveys indicate that 50% of the non-financial firms in the United States use 
derivatives (e.g. Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998)).  Prior research suggests that firms use 
derivatives to manage risk.1  Although researchers have identified market frictions (e.g. taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, or agency costs) that explain why firms hedge, financial economists have paid 
scant attention to the choice of derivative instruments and multi-period hedging methods.  This 
dissertation seeks to address two general research questions.  First, why do firms choose linear 
(e.g. futures, forwards, swaps) or nonlinear (e.g. options) instruments?  I examine empirically the 
choice of derivative contracts by 382 U.S. corporate firms (920 firm-year observations) over the 
period 1992 -1996.  Second, how well a long-term exposure to asset prices can be neutralized 
using a stacked hedge rather than a strip hedge?  In a stacked hedge, firms hedge the long-term 
exposures by repeatedly rolling nearby futures contracts until settlement.  In contrast, the strip 
hedge uses a portfolio of futures contracts of different maturities to match required cash flows.  
The approach here is to examine competing models and to test their predictions using empirical 
data on both investment and commercial assets.      
In a perfect world, there is no justification for corporate risk management.  Shareholders 
can efficiently hedge their own exposures by holding well-diversified portfolios.  Financial 
economists (e.g. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Schafstein, and Stein (1993)) have relied on 
                                                 
1 Bodnar, et al. (1996) provide survey evidence that firms use derivatives primarily to manage volatility in cash 
flows and accounting earnings.  Tufano’s (1998) evidence suggests that gold-mining firms use derivatives to reduce 
risks.  Guay (1999) also finds that firms that start using interest rate or exchange rate derivatives experience a 









market imperfections to provide theoretical backgrounds for corporate hedging.  The 
shareholder-value-maximization paradigm suggests that hedging is a value-increasing strategy 
because it can reduce expected taxes, lower the costs of financial distress, or alleviate the 
underinvestment problem that occurs when cash flow is volatile and external financing is costly.  
The agency theory posits that managers engage in corporate hedging program to maximize their 
personal wealth.   The empirical literature provides evidence that both value maximization and 
managerial incentives motivate corporate derivatives use (e.g. Tufano (1996), Geczy, Minton, 
and Schrand (1997), and Allayannis and Weston (2001)).   
The goal of my dissertation is not to expand on the reasons why firms hedge but instead 
to take this as given and shed light on corporate use of hedging instruments and methods.              
In Chapter 2, I extend the testable implications of extant theories on derivatives use to explain 
why firms use linear or nonlinear derivatives.  A substantial body of empirical research on 
hedging has relied primarily on survey data (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Tufano 
(1996, 1998), Haushalter (2000), and Adam (2003)).  In contrast, my study uses publicly 
available information on derivatives use and thus does not suffer from non-response bias typical 
of survey samples.  Due to the paucity of a rigorous theoretical framework, my empirical 
analysis remains somewhat exploratory.   
Analyzing the 382 non-financial firms, I find that the determinants that affect the 
likelihood of undertaking linear and nonlinear devices significantly influence the extent to which 
corporations use linear and nonlinear derivative contracts.  My results suggest that both value 









Supporting the investment opportunity hypothesis, I find that the use of nonlinear 
derivatives is positively related to market-to-book assets.  This evidence is consistent with the 
notion that firms with enhanced investment opportunities have greater incentives to use nonlinear 
instruments to reduce downside risk but also preserve upside gains derived from the investment 
opportunities.  Linear securities eliminate both the lower tail and the upper tail of a cash 
distribution, resulting in the potential loss of the growth opportunities.  This result also 
complements Adam’s (2003) finding for gold-mining industry that corporations with larger 
capital expenditures are more likely to use nonlinear contracts to hedge the financing risk 
dynamically.   
  The use of nonlinear devices is also positively related to stock option grants but is 
negatively related to bonus compensation.2  These findings suggest that managers who receive 
greater compensation from stock options have greater incentives to adopt derivatives that have 
nonlinear payoffs to raise their expected compensation.  The negative relation with bonus 
payments suggests that the “stair-step” function of bonus payments induces managers whose 
payments are at or near the cap to use linear derivative securities.  These results support Smith 
and Stulz’s (1985) prediction that hedging policies reflect the incentives provided in 
compensation contracts.    
  I document evidence consistent with a stream of empirical research that corporate risk 
management is related to firm size (e.g. Nance, et al. (1993), Bodnar, et al. (1998), and 
Haushalter (2000)).  I find a positive relation between firm size and nonlinear derivative usage.      
                                                 
2 Due to data limitations, I do not report the results related to CEO compensation variables in this dissertation.  See 









This finding supports the premise that larger firms have more resources to invest in sophisticated 
control systems and employees with the ability to manage (more complex) nonlinear derivative 
portfolios. This evidence is consistent with the existence of significant costs associated with 
managing nonlinear derivative contracts.      
  My results shed light on the relation between free cash flow and nonlinear usage.   I find 
that corporate uses of both linear and nonlinear derivatives increase with free cash flow.  This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that costly external financing precludes firms from using 
derivatives.  I also document that the proportion of nonlinear instruments in the firm’s hedge 
portfolio is positively related to free cash flow.  This evidence suggests that financial slack 
allows firms to use nonlinear derivative contracts to preserve upside potential for shareholders 
without incurring the higher costs of external financing.  These results support the theory that 
external sources of finance are more costly than internal capital (e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984), 
and Froot, et al. (1993)).   
  Additionally, I find an inverse relation between CEO tenure and nonlinear usage.  This 
evidence seems consistent with the hypothesis that managers who have held office longer are 
more risk averse (e.g. May (1995)).  Alternatively, more tenured managers face a shorter horizon 
and thus possibly lack the incentives to gain the necessary knowledge to understand the 
relatively complex nonlinear contracts.         
  Finally, my data indicate that the use of nonlinear derivative contracts increases with the 
prospect of financial distress.  I find that the use of nonlinear vehicles is positively related to 
leverage and industry-adjusted leverage, but is negatively related to Z-score and coverage ratio.  








have greater incentives to use nonlinear instruments to mitigate the underinvestment problem 
that arises when the gains from profitable projects strictly accrue to bondholders.  Linear 
securities lock in predetermined gains and thus exacerbate the debt overhang problem.   I do not 
observe a negative relation between the use of nonlinear hedging and convertible debt.  Overall, 
my evidence is not consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis that firms execute a nonlinear 
strategy to preserve upside potential for the shareholders at the expense of debtholders.     
     Chapter 3 evaluates the effectiveness of stacked hedge techniques, which 
Metallgesellschaft A.G. used to reduce its exposures to oil prices.   My hypothesis is that stacked 
hedges perform better with investment assets than with commercial commodities.  Unlike 
investment assets, commercial commodities are those held for production or consumption 
purposes and thus have non-trivial convenience yields.  Marginal convenience yield is the benefit 
which one derives from holding the commodity physically and generally follows a mean-
reverting process (e.g. Fama and French (1987, 1988)).  The effectiveness of stacked hedges 
depends on hedged assets obeying spot-futures parity.  Since deviations from spot-futures parity 
are a result of stochastic convenience yields, stacked hedges should perform better with 
investment assets than with commercial commodities.     
  I examine the hedging problem facing the agent as discussed in Hilliard (1999) with 
applications to three investment assets and to three commercial commodities.  The economic 
agent has long-term deterministic commodity supply commitments and wishes to hedge those 
long-term exposures by sequentially rolling nearby futures contracts until settlement. The 
commercial commodities are heating oil, light crude oil, and unleaded gasoline.  The investment 








hedges perform better with investment assets than with commercial commodities.  The stacked 
hedge produces an R2 of at least 0.98 for investment assets and R2 of less than 0.83 for heating 
oil.  I also document that the differences in hedge performance between the two classes of assets 
are attributed to the stochastic nature of convenience yields of commercial commodities.        
  The dissertation proceeds as follows.  In Chapter 2, I examine the determinants of the 
choice of derivative financial instruments.  Chapter 3 measures the performance of stacked hedge 
techniques with applications to investment assets and to commercial commodities.  Chapter 4 









THE DETERMINANTS OF THE CHOICE OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS:  
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF HEDGING PRACTICES IN US CORPORATE FIRMS 
 
2.1   Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine empirically the use of derivatives by publicly held firms. I 
broadly classify derivative instruments as linear (e.g. forwards, swaps) and nonlinear (e.g. 
options) derivatives.  My research seeks to answer the following question: For those firms that 
use derivatives, why do they use linear or nonlinear instruments?  The optimal use of derivatives 
can mitigate market impediments and create shareholder value.  Alternatively, managers can 
choose derivatives to create private benefits for themselves, possibly at the expense of the 
shareholders. My evidence suggests that both value maximization and personal incentives 
explain the use of linear and nonlinear derivatives by corporations. 
The finance literature suggests that hedging risks provides the primary motivation for 
corporations to use derivatives.  In perfect capital markets, corporate hedging is irrelevant since 
shareholders can efficiently hedge their own risks by holding well-diversified portfolios. 
However, several recent theories suggest that market frictions cause widely held firms to engage 
in hedging programs.  For example, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that hedging is beneficial 
because it can lower the expected costs of financial distress or expected taxes.  Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) show that hedging can mitigate the underinvestment problem that 
occurs when cash flow is volatile and external sources of finance are costly.  Previous empirical 
studies lend some support to these theoretical incentives (e.g. Nance, Smith, and Smithson 
(1993), Mian (1996), Tufano (1996), and Haushalter (2000)).  Nevertheless, few studies have 









This chapter contributes to the literature on the use of derivatives by corporations in two 
ways. First, I propose a wide variety of testable implications that incorporate both firm 
characteristics and managerial incentives.  Due to the lack of a rigorous theoretical framework, 
my study remains somewhat exploratory.  I examine the firm and managerial characteristics that 
have been shown to influence the decision for corporations to hedge at all.  In particular, I 
examine whether the decision to choose particular derivative securities is related to investment 
opportunity, free cash flow, firm size, tax incentives, capital structure, managerial compensation 
policy, CEO tenure and age, and managerial performance.  Second, unlike early empirical 
research using survey data (e.g. Tufano (1996, 1998) and Haushalter (2000)), this chapter uses 
publicly available information on the use of derivatives by corporations and does not suffer from 
non-response bias.  
I examine the choice of derivative securities by 382 U.S. corporate firms (920 firm-year 
observations) over the period 1992-1996.  To gain insight into my research questions, I analyze 
both the extent of linear (nonlinear) derivative usage and the intensity of nonlinear derivative 
usage.  I measure the extent of derivatives used by a corporation as the total notional value of the 
derivatives relative to firm size.  I measure the intensity of nonlinear derivative usage as the 
fraction of nonlinear derivatives, as determined by notional values, in the firm’s derivative 
portfolio. 
My results suggest that the determinants that affect the likelihood of adopting nonlinear 
(linear) instruments significantly influence the extent of nonlinear (linear) hedging.  I observe a 








firm size, free cash flow, leverage, and industry-adjusted leverage.  However, I document an 
inverse relation with CEO tenure, bonus plans, Z-score, and the coverage ratio.   
The results support several explanations for corporate risk management.  First, the 
positive coefficient on growth opportunity suggests that firms with more investment 
opportunities have greater incentives to undertake nonlinear devices to preserve upside potential.  
This finding also supports Adam’s (2003) hypothesis that firms with relatively large investment 
programs are prone to adopt nonlinear derivatives because they frequently face more complex 
hedging problems.   
Second, some of my results that are not reported in this study suggest that CEOs with 
greater compensation from stock options are more likely to use derivatives that preserve 
nonlinear payoffs.  In addition, I document that the feature of the limited upside potential of 
bonus compensation discourages managers from undertaking nonlinear hedging.  These findings 
are consistent with Smith and Stulz’s (1985) prediction that the compensation package affects 
the hedging decision.   
Third, the positive relation with firm size supports the notion that larger firms are more 
likely to have resources to invest in sophisticated control systems and personnel capable of 
administering sophisticated instruments.  This result compares to a stream of empirical literature 
that the likelihood of hedging is related to size (e.g. Booth, Smith, and Stolz (1984), Block and 
Gallagher (1986), Nance, et al. (1993), and Haushalter (2000)).   
Fourth, I find that relative to firm size, free cash flow is positively related to the notional 
amounts of both linear and nonlinear derivatives.  For firms that are the heaviest derivative users, 








free cash flow.  These findings suggest that financial slack is valuable to firms and that firms use 
derivatives to hedge against the loss of this slack.  As free cash flow increases, firms are more 
likely to have the internal resources to fund nonlinear derivatives to preserve upside potential for 
shareholders.  Together, these findings support the concept that external financing is more costly 
than internal capital because of the adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf (1984), Froot, 
et al. (1993)).   
Fifth, the negative coefficient on CEOs tenure supports the view that more tenured CEOs 
are more risk averse (e.g. May (1995)).  Alternatively, this result is also consistent with the 
premise that managers with longer tenures are closer to retirement and face a horizon problem.  
Given their short horizons, they possibly lack the incentives to invest effort to understand the 
more complex nonlinear instruments.    
Finally, my results outlined above for the variables pertaining to leverage, industry-
adjusted leverage, Z-score, and coverage ratio are consistent with the underinvestment 
hypothesis.  As the probability of distress increases, the likelihood that the firm would forgo 
valuable investment opportunities also increases (Myers (1977)).  My evidence suggests that 
firms facing the prospect of financial distress use nonlinear instruments to hedge against this 
underinvestment problem but also preserve upside potential for the shareholders.  I do not 
observe a negative relation between nonlinear usage and convertible debt.   Thus, my evidence 
lends no support to the risk-shifting hypothesis that corporations adopt nonlinear devices at the 
expense of the debtholders.      
The chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 2.2, I review the existing theories and 








characteristics and managerial incentives that affect the choice of derivative instruments. I 
propose hypotheses and explore a variety of empirical implications that are related to the choice 
of hedging instruments.  I describe my sample and dependent variables in Section 2.4 and 
present my empirical results in Section 2.5 and Section 2.6.   Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.  
2.2   Prior Research on the Choice of Derivatives 
  The financial economics literature (e.g. Black (1976), Moriarty, Phillips, and Tosini 
(1981)) classifies instruments whose payoff structure is linear in the price of the underlying asset 
as linear derivatives.  Linear securities include forwards, futures, swaps, etc.  Nonlinear 
instruments, such as options, produce a payment only in certain states of nature.  The nonlinear 
strategy protects against the lower tail of the payoff and maintains the upper tail of a cash 
distribution.  In contrast, the linear hedge, under price convergence, results in a risk-less payoff.   
In the absence of market frictions, it costs nothing to enter linear instruments because the 
delivery prices are chosen so that the values of the linear derivatives to both sizes are zero.  
However, it is not costless to use nonlinear contracts since they confer the holder the right to buy 
or sell the underlying asset for a certain price.     
Detemple and Adler (1988) argue that investors facing borrowing constraints have the 
incentives to use options because financing the margin on futures with short sale of risky 
securities would generate additional risk.  Froot, et al. (1993) show that if the sensitivities of 
investment spending to changes in the risk variable are constant, linear strategies will be optimal; 
otherwise firms would prefer the nonlinear hedge.  Brown and Toft (2002) show that when the 
levels of quantity risk are nontrivial, or when hedgable and unhedgable risks are negatively 








demonstrate that customized exotic derivatives are typically better than vanilla derivatives when 
these circumstances arise.  Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002a) derive a similar result.  Their model 
shows that the negative correlation between output levels and prices exacerbates the over-
hedging problem and hence induces the firm to use nonlinear vehicles.   
Perhaps because of the paucity of rigorous models that produce testable hypotheses, the 
existing empirical research into corporate choice of derivatives is limited.  Tufano (1996) lends 
no support to Detemple and Adler’s (1988) model that firms facing financial constraints are more 
likely to use option contracts.  Kim, Nam, and Thornton (2001) provide evidence that CEOs who 
receive more compensation from option grants are prone to undertake nonlinear hedging.  Their 
evidence is consistent with Smith and Stulz (1985) who argue that that the management 
compensation package affects the hedging that managers undertake.  Gay, et al. (2002b) support 
the theory that nonlinear derivative usage will increase with the costs of over-hedging.  
Supporting Froot, et al.’s hypothesis (1993), Adam (2003) finds that gold mining firms facing a 
more complex hedging problem are more likely to adopt nonlinear derivatives.   
2.3    Hypotheses Development 
Despite the lack of models that produce specific testable hypotheses, I can extend 
corporate finance theory and risk management theory to suggest rationales for the choice of 
derivative security by corporations.  In this section, I develop hypotheses for why corporations or 
managers would prefer a linear or a nonlinear device.   
   2.3.1  Investment Opportunities 
I argue that high-growth firms will use nonlinear hedging more extensively than will low-








thus have greater incentives to use nonlinear derivatives.  Linear derivatives eliminate not only 
downside risk but also upside potential, resulting in the potential loss of positive gains derived 
from the investment opportunities. Thus, I expect that firms with greater investment 
opportunities adopt more nonlinear devices to take advantage of the substantial potential.  
Alternatively, Adam (2003) extends Froot, et al.’s (1993) theory of risk management, and 
argues that firms with relatively large investment programs tend to engage in nonlinear 
instruments because they frequently face more complex hedging problems.  He illustrates that 
complex hedging problems require hedge ratios to be “customized” on a state-by-state basis.  
Since high-growth firms often face more complex hedging problems, they are more inclined to 
use nonlinear derivatives to hedge the financing risk dynamically.  Like Smith and Watts (1992), 
I use the ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets to proxy for growth 
opportunities.    
 2.3.2  Free Cash Flow 
Financial slack is valuable to firms since it allows them to fund positive NPV projects 
without incurring the higher costs of external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Thus, firms 
with free cash flow have the incentive to hedge with derivative contracts to protect this valuable 
asset.  Relative to firm size, I expect both the use of linear and nonlinear contracts to increase 
with free cash flow.  As free cash flow increases, firms are less likely to have to resort to costly 
external financing, which makes funds available to purchase nonlinear derivatives.  Since these 
contracts preserve upside potential for investors, I expect that firms will use more nonlinear 
devices as the budget constraint is lessened.  Therefore, I expect a positive relation between the 








Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989), I measure free cash flow before investment as 
operating income before depreciation less total income taxes plus changes in deferred taxes from 
the previous year to the current year less gross interest expense on short- and long-term debt less 
total amount of preferred dividend requirement on cumulative preferred stock and dividends paid 
on noncumulative preferred stock less total dollar amount of dividends on common stock.     
  2.3.3  Firm Size 
The empirical literature documents that the likelihood of hedging increases with firm 
size. Dolde’s (1993) survey data indicates that management’s lack of familiarity with 
sophisticated financial instruments is a major impediment toward the hedging activities.  
Presumably, large firms can use their resources to attract employees who have the ability and 
knowledge required to manage derivative securities.  Supporting this premise, researcher (Booth, 
et al. (1984), Block and Gallagher (1986), Nance, et al. (1993), Haushalter (2000)) find that 
larger firms tend to hedge more extensively. 
I extend this logic to propose that larger firms are more likely to implement nonlinear 
strategies.  These firms have more resources to invest in sophisticated control systems and more 
people with the ability to manage (more complex) nonlinear derivative portfolios.  I measure 
firm size as the sum of the book value of the firm’s debt and preferred stock plus the market 
value of common equity.   
2.3.4 Tax Structure 
Mayers and Smith (1982), and Smith and Stulz (1985) show that hedging increases the 
expected value of the firm when a progressive statutory tax schedule creates convexity in the 








firm’s taxable income, the after-tax firm value is an increasing and concave function of the 
firm’s taxable income.  The corporate tax code stipulates that the firm with taxable income (0-
$100k) is in the tax progressive region.  In addition, tax preference items, such as tax loss 
carryforwards, investment tax credits, and foreign tax credits, extend the convex region.  
Therefore, the firm with more tax preference items is more likely to manage risks to preserve the 
tax benefit of hedging.  Nance, et al. (1993) find evidence that firms that face more convex tax 
functions are more likely to hedge.   
If the tax advantages are sufficiently large, firms in the progressive tax region have an 
incentive to forego upside potential to insure that they receive the tax advantages.  I expect that 
firms with more tax preference items, which increase the likelihood that they fall in the 
progressive region, will use linear derivatives to preserve the tax shield.  Since the convex region 
is small, these tax-induced benefits from the linear hedging are limited.  Following Tufano 
(1996), I use the book value of tax loss carryforwards scaled by firm value to measure the firm’s 
ability to extend the progressive tax region.  
  2.3.5 Capital Structure 
As the likelihood of financial distress increases, firms have the incentives to forgo 
positive net present value projects since it becomes more likely that the gains from these projects 
will strictly accrue to bondholders (Myers, 1977).  Firms can mitigate this underinvestment 
problem if they insure against these outcomes.  However, if they use linear derivatives, they will 
lock in predetermined gains and shareholders will not benefit from upside potential.  Thus, I 









Alternatively, as leverage increases, shareholders have the incentive to engage in risky 
strategies that transfer wealth from debtholders to the shareholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976, 
Myers, 1977).  Presumably, firms should not, cannot and do not perfectly hedge all uncertainties.  
If debt were impaired in certain states of the world, the use of nonlinear derivatives, which are 
costly, would reduce the assets available to debtholders but preserve upside potential for 
shareholders in other states of the world.  Green (1984) shows that the substitution of convertible 
debt for straight debt mitigates such conflicts of interest between a firm’s bondholders and its 
shareholders. Thus, if managers use nonlinear derivatives to pursue risk-shifting strategies, I 
expect a positive relation between nonlinear derivatives and financial leverage, but a negative 
relation with convertible debt. 
In summary, my analysis allows us to shed light on the underinvestment hypothesis and 
the risk-shifting hypothesis.  A positive relation between nonlinear derivative usage and 
measures of financial distress and no relation with convertible debt support the underinvestment 
hypothesis.  A positive relation between nonlinear derivative usage and financial leverage 
combined with a negative relation with convertible debt supports the risk-shifting hypothesis, but 
does not rule out the underinvestment hypothesis. 
To measure the probability of financial distress, I use four variables: the ratio of book 
value of long-term debt to firm size, an industry-adjusted-leverage indicator variable, Altman’s 
(1993) Z-score, and the coverage ratio.  I set the value of the indicator variable to one if the 
firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero 
otherwise.  The Z-score measures the probability of bankruptcy.  A Z-score that is less than 1.81 








that there is a low probability of bankruptcy.  I define the coverage ratio as earnings before 
depreciation scaled by interest.  I use convertible debt scaled by firm size to measure the level of 
convertible debt.   
   2.3.6   CEO Compensation Policy 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the form of managerial compensation contracts can 
influence a firm’s hedging policies.  I examine three components of executive compensation: 
annual bonus plans, stock option grants, and restricted stock plans.  I predict that CEOs with 
greater stock option awards will implement nonlinear hedging strategies more extensively.  In 
contrast, CEOs who receive more restricted stock grants have the incentives to adopt more linear 
derivative securities.  I make no prediction for the relation between derivative choice and cash 
bonuses.  I measure incentives provided by the form of the management compensation contract 
as one plus the logarithm of the value of the stock options awards, stock grants, or cash bonus 
awards, respectively.    
CEOs who receive more stock option grants have greater incentives to use nonlinear 
instruments.  The manager’s compensation from stock options is a convex function of firm value.  
It follows that the expected payoff of managerial stock options is higher if the firm does not 
completely eliminate risk.  Unlike linear devices, nonlinear derivatives reduce rather than 
eliminate volatilities of a firm’s payoffs.  Consequently, managers who receive more stock 
options have stronger incentives to administer nonlinear contracts to raise their expected 
compensation.  Murphy (1998) documents that in 95% of stock option grants the exercise price 
equals the fair market value on date of grant.  The “at-the-money” feature of stock option grants 









Restricted stock grants exacerbate a manager’s risk aversion since restricting the manager 
to hold the firm’s stock forces him to hold an undiversified portfolio.  To the extent that the 
manager would have to bear the costs of a nonlinear hedge, he has the incentive to use linear 
derivatives and lock in the value of his stock grants.  I expect that a CEO who receives greater 
compensation from restricted stocks will use more linear derivatives.  However, the fact that the 
CEO bears only a small fraction of the costs of the nonlinear derivatives makes this a relatively 
weak hypothesis.       
Smith and Stulz (1985) document that bonus payments are a convex function of 
accounting earnings.  When the firm’s accounting earnings exceed the target number, the CEO 
receives a bonus.  However, when the accounting earnings are below the threshold, the manager 
receives no bonus payment.  Since bonuses have option-like features, managers who have greater 
bonus compensation have the incentives to prefer nonlinear derivatives.   
Murphy (1998) finds that bonus plans are generally capped and hence do not have 
unlimited upside potential.  Bonus payments do not generally increase linearly with accounting 
earnings, but rather follow a “stair-step” function.  This feature implies that managers whose 
bonus payments are at or near the cap have the incentives to use linear devices to lock in the 
bonus.  In this case, the upside potential of accounting earnings would add little or no additional 
value to the bonus.  As a result, I make no prediction for the relation between the derivative 
choice and bonus payments.   
Due to the lack of data, this analysis does not include compensation variables.  In a 








nonlinear derivatives and compensation from stock options.  In addition, they observe a negative 
relation between nonlinear derivative usage and bonus compensation.  This result supports the 
argument that the feature of the limited upside potential in bonus compensation discourages 
managers from undertaking nonlinear hedging.  They do not find any relation between restricted 
stock grants and the derivative choice.        
  2.3.7 CEO Tenure and Age 
May (1995) argues that more tenured CEOs are more risk averse because their 
experiences and managerial skills are unique to a specific firm.  Supporting his argument, May 
finds a negative and significant relation between CEO tenure and the variance of the firm’s 
equity return and debt to equity ratio.  Tufano (1996) argues that CEO age serves as a proxy for 
risk aversion because older managers prefer to reduce the variance of their portfolios.  This line 
of reasoning suggests that older CEOs or more tenured CEOs are more likely to undertake linear 
derivatives to bear no risk.  Older CEOs with more tenure are also more likely to have a short 
horizon since they are closer to retirement than younger CEOs.  Thus, the older CEOs have less 
incentive to invest any effort to gain the necessary knowledge to understand the relatively more 
complex nonlinear derivatives.   
Alternatively, if a CEO nearing retirement bears only a fraction of the cost of the 
nonlinear derivative, he has the incentive to choose nonlinear derivatives since they would guard 
against downside losses but preserve upside potential.  In this case, the CEO potentially uses the 










   2.3.8  Managerial Performance 
Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) propose that managers with superior abilities are prone 
to hedge. They argue that hedging eliminates extraneous noise and thus improves the 
informativeness of management ability. Their model suggests that managers who have 
performed well in the past have the incentives to hedge so that the market can draw more precise 
inference about their abilities.  Therefore, this argument suggests that managers with superior 
capabilities are more likely to use linear securities to completely hedge all uncertainties and 
exactly communicate their skills to the labor market.  I measure managerial skill as the average 
of the firm’s return on equity over a three-year period prior to the year when the firm undertakes 
particular instruments.     
2.4 Sample Description and Dependent Variable 
I obtain data on the use of derivatives by publicly traded firms in the United States for the 
fiscal years 1992–1996 from the Third Quarter 1997 Edition of Database of Users of Derivatives, 
published by Swaps Monitor Publications, Inc.  The information contained in this database 
comes from annual reports or 10K statements.  The data restrict this study to corporate uses of 
interest rate and currency derivatives.  Many commodity financial instruments are not considered 
derivatives and are not disclosed under SFAS 119 because they could be physically delivered.   
  The database distinguishes hedging activities from trading purposes to a large degree 
because SFAS 119 requires firms to report detailed information on the notional position and 
purpose of derivative holdings.  A random investigation of actual annual reports also reveals that 
my sample firms hold derivatives for hedging activities.  I also randomly compare reported data 









Hypothesized Relations Between Firm Characteristics and Nonlinear Usage 
Hypothesis Variable Sign Data Description 
Investment opportunities Market-to-book Assets + The ratio of the market to the book value 
of total assets 
 
 
Firm size Log (Firm value) + Log of the sum of the book value of the 
firm’s debt and preferred stock plus the 
market value of common equity  
Free Cash Flows 
 
Free Cash Flow + The value of (OIBDP – TXT + TXDITC 
– XINT - DVP – DVC) scaled by firm 
size  
 
Tax Structure Tax Loss Carryforwards − The book value of tax loss carryforwards 
scaled by firm size 
Capital Structure Leverage + Long-term debt scaled by firm size  
Capital Structure Leverage Indicator + I set the value of the indicator variable to 
one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater 
than the average of its two-digit SIC 
code industry, and zero otherwise.   
 
Capital Structure Coverage Ratio  − Earnings before depreciation divided by 
interest expenses 
Capital Structure Z-score − Z-score is a measure of bankruptcy 
Managerial Performance Return on Equity − The average return on equity over a 
three-year period 
 
CEO Tenure and Age CEO Tenure − The number of years since the CEO has 
been in the position 
 








The Interest Rate and Currency Edition of the Database presents the notional positions of 
interest rate and currency derivatives used by 1,698 corporate firms, with 10,188 firm-year 
observations available.  The observations that I include in the analysis must have positive 
notional amount of either interest rate or currency derivatives, and have filed a proxy statement 
for any year between 1991 and 1995.  I exclude observations that have unavailable data from 
Standard and Poor’s Research Insight database.  Excluding the coverage ratio, Z-score, and CEO 
age in the analysis results in a sample of 382 firms and 920 firm-year observations.  After 
eliminating observations that are missing CEO age, my sample consists of 259 firms and 584 
firm-year observations.   
  Table 2.2 breaks down the frequency of various instruments that the sample firms use to 
manage interest rate and currency exposures across the years.  The data indicate that some firms 
use more than one type of derivative instruments in their hedge portfolios.  In results not reported 
in the table, I find that nearly 77% of the 382 firms in my sample use only linear derivatives, less 
than 6% use only nonlinear contracts, and approximately 18% use both linear and nonlinear 
derivative instruments in the hedge portfolio.  Consistent with the Wharton/CIBC Survey (1995), 
my results suggest that a greater fraction of firms hedge interest rate exposures with swaps and 
manage currency risks with forward and futures contracts.    
 I construct the extent of linear and nonlinear hedging as the dependent variable in 
multivariate cross-sectional regressions.  I measure the degree of linear and nonlinear hedging 
two ways.  One measure is the total notional value of nonlinear (linear) derivatives scaled by the 
firm’s total assets or firm size.  This measure gauges the degree to which a firm hedges its total 









Derivative Instruments Firms Use to Manage Interest Rate and Currency Risks  
This table presents the various types of financial instruments that the 382 sample firms (920 firm-year observations) use to 
manage interest rate and currency risks in the fiscal years 1992-1996.  The data indicates that some firms use more than one type 
of financial instruments in their hedge portfolios.  Interest rate options & others include caps, floors, collars, corridors, 
swaptions, and options on swap spreads.   I report the fraction of firms that use particular derivatives by year.     
 
Financial Instrument 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Interest Rate Derivatives 
    Swaps 
    Forwards & Futures 




  3.70% 
  7.41% 
 
49.46% 












  2.53% 
16.67% 
Currency Derivatives 
    Swaps 
    Forwards & Futures  































estimate of the extent to which a firm uses linear and nonlinear derivatives in the composition of 
the hedge portfolio.  This is important because a firm could demand linear and nonlinear hedging 
contracts simultaneously.  For my second variable, I scale the total notional position of nonlinear 
derivatives by the total notional value of the hedge portfolio.  I refer this measure to as the 
intensity of nonlinear usage. The intensity of nonlinear usage determines the component of 
nonlinear contracts in the hedge portfolio.     
2.5  Univariate Results  
  Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the variables that I use in the tests.  The mean 
and median fractions of total assets hedged are 14.12% and 7.29%.  Linear derivatives dominate 
nonlinear contracts in the composition of a typical hedge portfolio.  On average, nonlinear 
derivatives account for less than 12% of the hedge portfolio.  The average (median) debt ratio is 
19.1% (15.6%) of firm value.  The distribution of the coverage ratio is highly skewed. The 
average (median) coverage ratio is 81.5 (7.96) times.  The median Z-score (3.2) is greater than 
3.0, which indicates that the typical sample firm has a low probability of bankruptcy.  There is a 
wide variation in firm value within the sample.  Firm size ranges from $101.3 million to more 
than $106.3 billion.  The ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets averages 1.35. 
The return on equity is less than 14% and appears to be slightly skewed.  The firms in the sample 
typically do not have any tax loss carryforwards, or issue any convertible debts.  The free cash 
flow in the median firm is more than 8% of firm value.  The average (median) CEO has been in 
position for about 7.5 (5) years.  The typical CEO is 56 years old.   
  Table 2.4 presents correlation coefficients for selected variables.  I define these variables 









Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
The Fraction of Total Assets Hedged is defined as the total notional values of derivative contracts scaled by total assets.  The Level of 
Nonlinear Hedging is the total notional amount of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the total notional amount of derivatives.  Leverage 
is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  I define Coverage Ratio as earnings before depreciation divided by interest.  Z-score is a 
measure of bankruptcy.  Firm Size is the market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to the book 
value of total assets.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.   Convertible Debt is 
convertible debt divided by firm size.  Return on Equity is the average three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  Free 
Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.   
 
Variable  N Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum   Maximum 
Fraction of Total Assets Hedged 920 0.1412 0.0729 0.2494   0.0000 2.9533 
Level of Nonlinear Hedging  920 0.1117 0.0000 0.2580 0.0000 1.0000 
Leverage  920 0.1910 0.1563 0.1606 0.0000 0.7669 
Coverage Ratio (times) 889 81.5876 7.96940 1,267 -572.60 27,160.8 
Z-score 854 4.1137 3.2150 3.5356 -0.164 35.675 
Firm Size ($US mil) 920 7,096.0698 2,616.6030 13,024.0909 101.3140 106,391.5320 
Market-to-Book Assets 920 1.3525 1.0950 0.8619 0.1695 6.0903 
Tax Loss Carryforwards  920 0.0213 0.0000 0.0818 0.0000 0.9743 
Convertible Debt 920 0.0123 0.0000 0.0381 0.0000 0.5287 
Return on Equity 920 0.1345 0.1229 0.2916 -0.9986 5.1032 
Free Cash Flow  920 0.0960 0.0847 0.0586 -0.0675 0.3488 
CEO Tenure 920 7.3978 5.0000 7.2169 0.0000 47.0000 










Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
This table presents correlation coefficients for variables of interest.   The variables are defined in Table 2.1.  ***, **, and * denote  





































  1.000 0.495***  0.043   0.692***  -0.100*** -0.152*** -0.367***   0.257***  0.145*** -0.107*** 
Leverage 
 





    1.000   0.199***  -0.019  0.088*** -0.026   0.013 -0.011 -0.020 
















          1.000  0.040 -0.121*** 
CEO Tenure 
 
          1.000  0.267*** 
CEO Age 
 








variables.  Of all the variables, there is a relatively strong coefficient between the market-to-book 
ratio of total assets and Z-score.  The coefficient is nearly 0.7.  It is also interesting to note that 
the correlation coefficient between CEO age and CEO tenure are positively correlated but the 
correlation coefficient is less than 0.27.      
  Table 2.5 compares the means of firm characteristics by the level of nonlinear derivative 
usage.  I classify a firm an extensive (minor) user of nonlinear vehicles if the total notional value 
of its nonlinear contracts account for more than (less than) 25% of its hedge portfolio.  The 
results indicate that both minor nonlinear users and extensive nonlinear firms manage risks more 
extensively than firms that do not implement nonlinear strategies at all (p-values = 0.00).  The 
finding is consistent with Adam’s (2003) finding that gold mining firms that embrace risk 
management more extensively are more likely to face a complex hedging problem and thus 
undertake more nonlinear contracts.   
  The univariate results generally support my hypotheses.  The results suggest that minor 
and extensive users of nonlinear instruments are larger than firms that do not implement a 
nonlinear strategy at all (p-values = 0.00 and 0.01, respectively).  This finding supports the 
premise that large firms frequently have the resources to invest in sophisticated control systems 
and hire personnel who are capable of administering nonlinear portfolios.  Consistent with the 
investment hypothesis, my results indicate that firms facing more investment opportunities are 
prone to use nonlinear derivatives (p-value = 0.01).  I also find that extensive nonlinear users 
have a higher leverage level but a significantly lower coverage ratio than zero nonlinear firms.3   
                                                 
3 Since the coverage ratio is highly skewed, I winsorize the sample at the 1% and 99% level and re-do the mean 










Characteristics of US Corporate Firms by the Level of Nonlinear Derivative Usage, 1992 - 1996 
This table presents characteristics of the sample firms by the degree of nonlinear derivative usage.  I classify a firm an extensive 
(minor) user of nonlinear vehicles if the total notional value of its nonlinear contracts account for more than (less than) 25% of its 
hedge portfolio.  I define the Fraction of Total Assets as the total notional position of all derivative contracts scaled by total assets.  I 
define the other variables in Table 2.1.  The sample size for Coverage Ratio is 666, 86, and 137 for zero nonlinear, minor nonlinear, 
and extensive nonlinear, respectively.  The respective sample size for Z-score is 645, 84, and 125.  For CEO Age, the respective 
sample size is 420, 64, and 100.   I show variables whose p-values at the ten percent level or less in boldface type.   
 
 




Extensive Nonlinear  
(N=142) P-Values Difference in Mean 







Fraction of Total Assets Hedged 0.1096 0.2579  0.2241 0.0001 <0.0001 
Level of Nonlinear Hedging 0.0000 0.1126 0.6545 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
Firm Size ($US mil) 5,510.8 15,538 9,638.3 < 0.0001 0.0133 
Market-to-Book Assets 1.2907 1.5618 1.5251 0.0117 0.0189 
Leverage 0.1857 0.1736 0.2280 0.5411 0.0113 
Coverage Ratio 105.06 11.2290 11.648 0.1012 0.1000 
Z-score 4.1056 4.2446 4.0680 0.6621 0.9155 
Convertible Debt 0.0116 0.0126 0.0157 0.8235 0.1847 
Tax Loss Carryforwards 0.0195 0.0281 0.0263 0.4355 0.4106 
Free Cash Flows 0.0961 0.0914 0.0982 0.3988 0.7109 
Return on Equity 0.1368 0.1226 0.1304 0.5311 0.7724 
CEO Tenure 7.7844 6.0460 6.3451 0.0071 0.0062 









The results support the underinvestment hypothesis that as the probability of financial 
distress increases, firms have greater incentives to hedge with nonlinear derivatives to 
mitigate the underinvestment problem but also benefit from upside potential for the 
shareholders.  I do not observe any significant result on convertible debt.  This finding 
lends no support to the risk-shifting hypothesis that firms use nonlinear derivative 
contracts at the expense of debtholders.  In results that are not reported in the table, I find 
that firms that do not use nonlinear devices at all perform better in the past than do the 
minor users of nonlinear derivatives.4   This result is consistent with the premise that 
managers with superior capabilities have the incentives to use linear securities to better 
communicate their skills to the labor market.  As expected, CEOs with longer tenures are 
less likely to use nonlinear vehicles (p-value = 0.00).   
2.6.  Multivariate Analysis    
  2.6.1 Tobit Analysis 
To investigate the determinants that affect the degree to which a firm uses linear 
and nonlinear derivatives, I estimate cross-sectional regressions using a Tobit model. 
This econometric model is appropriate because my dependent variable is censored at 
zero.  I am interested in the level of linear and nonlinear hedging demanded.  However, 
my measure only captures the actual level used because costs might prevent some firms 
from implementing either strategy.  My dependent variable is censored at zero when the 
level demanded is transformed to the actual level used.  I present the marginal effects 
defined as the partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable with 
                                                 
4 The results from the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test suggest that firms that do not adopt nonlinear contracts 
perform better in the past than do the minor users of nonlinear derivatives (p-value = 0.03).   However, I do 








respect to the determinant.  Similarly, Tobit analysis applies when I estimate the 
determinants of the extent of hedging. 
Regressions 1 to 3 in Table 2.6 estimate the determinants of the extent of hedging, 
conditional on a firm hedging.  Consistent with Froot, et al.’s (1993) prediction, I find 
that the extent of hedging increases with market-to-book assets (p-values = 0.09, 0.00, 
and 0.10, respectively). This relation suggests that hedging can reduce the 
underinvestment problem when access to external financing is costly.  Leverage is 
positively related to the degree of hedging (significant at 10% in model 2).  This finding 
supports Smith and Stulz’s (1985) premise that risk management reduces the probability 
of incurring bankruptcy costs.  The positive relation with return on equity is significant at 
the 5% level (model 2).  This result is consistent with Breeden and Viswanathan’s (1998) 
contention that managers who have superior abilities tend to hedge risks so that the 
market can draw more precise inference about their abilities.  The relation with CEO age 
is negative and significant at the 5% level, consistent with the view that older CEOs are 
less likely to understand derivatives.     
Table 2.7 reports Tobit regression results with the total notional value of 
nonlinear derivatives scaled by the book value of total assets as the dependent variable.  I 
document a positive relation between firm size and the level of nonlinear hedging 
(significant at the 1% level).  This evidence is consistent with the premise that larger 
firms have more resources to hire sophisticated employees who can manage more 
complex nonlinear derivatives.  Confirming Adam’s (2003) finding, I find that firms with 









Tobit Regression Results  - Analysis of the Extent of Hedging  
The table presents a Tobit analysis of the extent of hedging, conditional on a firm 
hedging.  The dependent variable is the total notional amount of derivatives scaled by 
total assets.  Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Firm size is the log of the market 
value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to the book 
value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  Convertible Debt is 
convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax 
loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to 
firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity prior to the 
decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.  
P-values are in parentheses. Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold. 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 














































































































Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Nonlinear Derivative Usage (Asset Measure) 
The dependent variable is the total notional amount of nonlinear derivatives scaled by 
total assets.  Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio 
of the market value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled 
by firm size.  Leverage Indicator is an indicator variable.  The value of the indicator 
variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit 
SIC code industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by 
firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by 
firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is 
the average of three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the 
number of years since the CEO has been in position.  P-values are in parentheses.  
Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold. 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






















































































































Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Nonlinear Derivative Usage (Size Measure) 
The dependent variable is the total notional amount of nonlinear derivatives scaled by 
firm size.  Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of 
the market value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by 
firm size.  The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is 
greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. 
Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the 
book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of 
free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity 
prior to the decision year.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten 
percent level or less are in bold. 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




















































































































assets (significant at the 1% level).  This evidence supports the premise that higher 
growth firms adopt more nonlinear derivatives to maintain a profit potential.  I find that 
firms that use more debt than their industry norm also use more nonlinear derivatives 
(significant at 1%, 5%, and 1% respectively).  I do not find any relation with convertible 
debt.  Taken together, these relations support the underinvestment hypothesis.  As 
expected, I also find that the extent of nonlinear hedging increases in the level of free 
cash flow (significant at 5%).  My results also suggest that the CEOs who have held 
office longer use fewer nonlinear derivatives (significant at the 10% and 1% levels 
respectively).  One interpretation of this finding is that these CEOs are closer to 
retirement and do not have the incentives to invest effort to learn about nonlinear devices.  
Table 2.8 provides qualitatively similar results when I define the dependent variable as 
the total notional amount of nonlinear instruments scaled by firm size.     
I reestimate Tobit regressions with the total notional value of linear instruments 
scaled by the book value of total assets as the dependent variable.  Table 2.9 identifies the 
determinants that affect the extent to which a firm hedges total assets with linear devices. 
The negative relation for leverage is significant at the 10% level in both model 1 and 
model 3, and the positive relation for free cash flow is significant at the 5% level in both 
models.  I inspect Table 2.7 and Table 2.9 jointly and provide two interesting findings. 
First, firms with more risky debt tend to rely less on linear instruments.  This evidence is 
consistent with the notion that firms with a higher probability of financial distress seek to 
increase nonlinear derivative usage to mitigate the underinvestment problem.  Second, 









Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Linear Derivative Usage (Asset Measure) 
The dependent variable is the notional amount of linear derivatives scaled by total assets.  
Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market 
value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  
Leverage Indicator is an indicator variable.  The value of the indicator variable is set to 
one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code 
industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size. 
Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  
Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average 
of three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of 
years since the CEO has been in position.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results 
significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





















































































































Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Linear Derivative Usage (Size Measure) 
The dependent variable is the total notional amount of linear derivatives scaled by firm 
size.  Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of total assets.   Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm 
size.  Leverage Indicator is an indicator variable.  The value of the indicator variable is 
set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code 
industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  
Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  
Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average 
of three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of 
years since the CEO has been in position.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results 
significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




















































































































This finding supports the hypothesis that financial slack allows firms to use derivatives 
without incurring a higher cost of external financing.   
  When the dependent variable is the total notional amount of linear securities 
scaled by firm size, the results are somewhat different.  The results in Table 2.10 indicate 
that linear usage decreases with market-to-book assets (significant at the 5%, 1%, and 5% 
levels respectively), but increases with leverage and return on equity (significant at the 
10% level in model 2).  The positive coefficient on market-to-book assets is consistent 
with the argument that firms with greater investment opportunities are more likely to use 
nonlinear contracts to preserve the upside potential.  In contrast, the positive signs on 
leverage and returns on equity do not support my hypotheses.  A possible explanation for 
these results is that firms use derivatives to hedge total assets rather than the market value 
of total assets.  This explanation suggests that the total notional value of linear securities 
scaled by total assets gauges the degree of linear hedging more accurately.       
Regressions 1 to 3 in Table 2.11 provide some implications on the components of 
linear and nonlinear instruments in the hedge portfolio.  I use the intensity of nonlinear 
usage as the dependent variable. Confirming my earlier findings from Table 2.7, I 
document positive relations between the component of nonlinear instruments in the hedge 
portfolio and firm size, market-to-book assets, and leverage indicator.  The relations for 
firm size and market-to-book assets are significant at the 1% level, and the relation with 
the industry-adjusted-leverage indicator variable is significant at the 10%, 10%, and 5% 
levels, respectively.  Also supporting my earlier results, I observe a negative relation 









Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Intensity of Nonlinear Usage 
The dependent variable is the total notional amount of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the 
total notional value of the hedge portfolio. Coefficients represent marginal effects.  
Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets.  
Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  The value of the indicator variable is set 
to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code 
industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size. 
Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  
Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average 
of three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of 
years since the CEO has been in position.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results 
significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 
























































































































(significant at the 10% and 1% levels respectively).  In general, the results in Table 2.11 
suggest that larger firms, firms with greater investment opportunities, and firms that have 
more risky debts than their industry norm use more nonlinear derivatives in their hedge 
portfolios.  CEOs who have held office longer implement nonlinear strategies less 
extensively.   
 Unlike the results in Table 2.7, those in Table 2.11 show that the variables 
pertaining to leverage are statistically significant at the 1% level but those related to free 
cash flows are not significant.  The differences in these two results suggest that a test 
using the extent of nonlinear hedging in total assets might not identify the determinants 
that affect the component of nonlinear contracts in the hedge portfolio.   
2.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
  In this section I explore the robustness of my results to alternative measures of 
leverage ratio and to alternative samples.  I find that the general results in Table 2.11 are 
not sensitive to alternative measures of leverage-related variables or to the subsamples of 
major and minor hedgers.  I also document that the relation with leverage-related factors 
is not restricted to the subsample of interest rate hedgers.    
  I use alternative measures of leverage ratio to inspect the robustness of the results 
in Table 2.11.  In particular, I use coverage ratio and Z-score to further examine the 
capital structure hypothesis, and find similar results.  Table 2.12 shows that firms with 
lower coverage ratios are inclined to manage risk with nonlinear derivatives (significant 
at the 1% level).  The results in Table 2.13 report that the extent of nonlinear derivative 









Tobit Results - Analysis of Intensity of Nonlinear Usage (Coverage Ratio) 
The dependent variable is the total notional value of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the 
total notional value of the hedge portfolio. Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Firm 
size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of total assets.  Coverage Ratio is defined as earnings 
before depreciation scaled by interest.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by 
firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by 
firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is 
the average of three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the 
number of years since the CEO has been in position.  P-values are in parentheses.  
Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold. 
 


















































































































Tobit Results - Analysis of Intensity of Nonlinear Usage (Z-score Measure) 
The dependent variable is the total notional value of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the 
total notional value of the hedge portfolio.  Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Firm 
size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of total assets.  Z-score is a measure of bankruptcy. 
Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the 
book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of 
free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity 
prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in 
position.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less 
are in bold.       
 

















































































































but positively related to convertible debt (significant at the 10% level in specification 2). 
Supporting the underinvestment hypothesis, I find that there is a positive relation between 
the intensity of nonlinear usage and the probability of financial distress.  The positive 
relation with convertible debt, however, is not consistent with the risk-shifting 
hypothesis.  Table 2.13 also presents evidence that firms carrying more free cash flow 
incorporate more nonlinear instruments in their hedge portfolio (significant at the 1% 
level).  This evidence is consistent with the notion that firms will use more nonlinear 
devices as the budget constraint is lessened.   
   To address the concern that firms engaging in extensive risk management might 
differ from those embracing moderate levels of risk management, I reestimate cross- 
sectional regressions using the tobit for the two subsamples: major and minor hedgers.  I 
classify a firm as a major hedger if the fraction of its total assets hedged exceeds the 
sample median (i.e. 0.07) and a minor hedger otherwise.  I document that the results are 
qualitatively similar when I consider each subsample.  I also find similar results when I 
winsorize the sample at the ninety-ninth percentile and first percentile, respectively, of 
the fraction of total assets hedged.  
All the specifications in Table 2.14 use a Tobit model to estimate the determinants 
of the extent to which a major hedger uses nonlinear instruments.  I use the intensity of 
nonlinear usage as the dependent variable.  I examine Table 2.11 and Table 2.14 jointly 
and find that the results from the sample of major hedgers are comparable to those from 
the full sample.  In particular, the extent of nonlinear hedging is positively related to firm 









Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Hedging Strategies, among Major Hedgers 
The firm is considered a major hedger if the fraction of its total assets hedged exceeds the 
median (0.07) of the 382 sample firms.  The dependent variable is the total notional value 
of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the total notional value of the hedge portfolio.  
Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market 
value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size. 
The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than 
the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is 
convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax 
loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to 
firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity prior to the 
decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.  
P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





















































































































Tobit Regression Results - Analysis of Hedging Strategies, among Minor Hedgers 
The firm is considered a minor hedger if the fraction of its total assets hedged is less than 
the median (0.07) of the 382 sample firms.  The dependent variable is the total notional 
value of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the notional amount of the hedge portfolio. 
Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market 
value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  
The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than 
the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is 
convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax 
loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to 
firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity prior to the 
decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.  
P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
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Number of Observations 














CEO tenure (model 2).  The relations for firm size, market-to-book assets, and 
CEOtenure are significant at the 1% level, and the relation with leverage is significant at 
the 5% level.     
  However, the results on the subsample of major hedgers do not suggest that a firm 
whose leverage is above its industry average uses more nonlinear instruments. In 
addition, the results show a strong and positive relation between the extent to which a 
major hedger uses nonlinear contracts and free cash flow (significant at the 1%, 10%, and 
1% levels, respectively). This evidence supports the prediction that firms with more 
financial slack are less likely to resort to external financing and thus find it more cost 
effective to fund the premiums on nonlinear devices.   
 Table 2.15 presents Tobit regression results for minor hedgers.  The signs for the 
coefficients in the data are similar to those when I consider the subsample of major 
hedgers.  The results from minor hedgers suggest that the intensity of nonlinear usage 
increases with firm size (significant at 1% in model 1 and 3), market-to-book assets 
(significant at 5% in model 2), and leverage (significant at 10%).  Nevertheless, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients and the levels, and the number of significances for minor 
hedgers are generally smaller than those for major hedgers.  For example, for major 
hedgers, the coefficients on market-to-book assets range from 0.04 to 0.05 and are 
significant at the 1% level.  For minor hedgers, the coefficient of 0.02 on the same 
determinant is only significant in model 2 at the 5% percent level.    
 There could be a possibility that the interest rate derivatives drive any relation 









Tobit Regression Results - Interest Rate Derivative Usage 
The dependent variable is the total notional value of interest rate nonlinear derivatives 
scaled by the total notional value of the interest rate derivatives.  Coefficients represent 
marginal effects.  Firm size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book 
Assets is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-
term debt scaled by firm size.  The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the 
firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss 
Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free 
Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of 
three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  P-values are in parentheses.  
Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 


























































































































Tobit Regression Results - Currency Derivative Usage 
The dependent variable is the total notional value of currency nonlinear derivatives scaled 
by the total notional amount of the currency derivatives.  Coefficients represent marginal 
effects.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total 
assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  The value of the indicator 
variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit 
SIC code industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by 
firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by 
firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is 
the average of three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  P-values are in 
parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 
























































































































nonlinear devices to benefit from favorable changes in interest rates.  To investigate the 
robustness of my results to the potential impact of debt ratio on the interest rate 
derivatives, I partition the full sample into two subsamples: interest rate and currency 
hedgers.  The results in Table 2.16 indicate that the positive relation between interest rate 
nonlinear usage and leverage is significant at the 1%, 10%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 2.17 presents evidence that the use of currency nonlinear derivatives increases with 
industry-adjusted leverage (significant at 5% level in model 1 and 3).  Thus, the relation 
between nonlinear derivative usage and leverage is not restricted to the subsample of 
interest rate hedgers.  
2.6.3  McDonald and Moffit’s Decomposition  
  McDonald and Moffit (1980) show that I can use the estimates from a Tobit 
analysis to determine both the changes in the probability that the dependent variable will 
be above the limit and the changes in the value of the dependent variable if the dependent 
variable is already above the limit.  I apply McDonald and Moffit’s decomposition to 
further analyze my Tobit results.  I decompose the change in any derivative usage into 
two components: (1) the marginal change in the positive expenditures on the derivative, 
and (2) the marginal change in the probability that the firm will use the derivative at all.    
Table 2.18 shows that 28.08% of the firm-year observations in model 1 of Table 
2.7 have nonzero expenditures on nonlinear derivatives.  Evaluating my data at this point, 
I find that a correspondingly lower percentage (23.02%) of any total changes in nonlinear 
derivative usage arise from the marginal changes in the positive expenditures on 









Decomposition of Tobit Effects 
The table illustrates the application of McDonald and Moffitt’s (1980) decomposition to the Tobit analyses in this chapter.  The 
fractions of mean total response due to response above limit are reported.  The fractions of sample above limit are in parentheses.       
 
Tobit Analysis Dependent Variable 
Fraction of Mean Total Response Due 
to Response above Limit (%) 
   Model 1          Model 2         Model 3 
All Hedgers 
(Table 2.7) 




































The notional value of nonlinear derivatives scaled by the total 
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results from the changes in the probability of using nonlinear derivatives at all.  In model 
2 of Table 2.7, 24.89% of the observations undertake nonlinear derivative. Most of any 
changes (77.98%) in nonlinear derivative usage take the form of the changes in the 
probability of using nonlinear instruments at all.  In addition, most of the changes in the 
position of nonlinear derivatives in model 3 are from the changes in the probability of 
adopting nonlinear devices at all (76.91%). 
  Table 2.18 also indicates that most of the total changes in any derivative usage in 
Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.11, 2.14 and 2.15 result from the changes in the probability of using the 
derivative at all.  Nearly 75% of the changes in nonlinear usages in Table 2.8 are from the 
changes in the probability that the firm will engage in nonlinear derivatives at all.  In 
Table 2.9, nearly 51 % to 60% of the total changes in linear hedging are from the 
marginal changes in the likelihood that the firm will use linear contracts at all.  More than 
75% of the changes in Table 2.11 come from the changes in the probability that a firm 
will adopt nonlinear vehicles.  In addition, most of the changes in Table 2.14 (70%) and 
Table 2.15 (80%) take the form of the changes in the likelihood of using nonlinear 
mechanism.  However, less than 50% of the total changes in the degree of linear hedging 
in Table 2.10 arise from the changes in the probability of using linear securities at all.  
2.6.4 Probit Model Results 
As I discussed above, most of the total changes in any derivative usage result 
from the changes in the probability of using the derivative at all.   In order to shed light 
on the marginal change in the likelihood that a firm will use any particular derivative, I 









Ordered Probit Regression Results - Analysis of the Derivative Users 
The dependent variable is coded zero if the firm uses linear derivative instruments only.  
It is one if the firm uses both linear and nonlinear derivatives.  It is coded two if the firm 
uses only nonlinear devices.  Firm size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-
to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt 
scaled by firm size.  The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage 
ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. 
Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the 
book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of 
free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity 
prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in 
position.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less 
are in bold.  
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




















































































































regressions of the choice of hedging strategies.  The dependent variable is zero, one, or 
two, which corresponds to the extent of nonlinear hedging.  I code the dependent variable 
zero if the firm uses only linear derivatives.  The dependent variable is one if the firm 
adopts both linear and nonlinear contracts.  It equals two if the firm undertakes only 
nonlinear derivatives.   
The results from ordered Probit regressions identify several factors that change 
the probability that a firm will include nonlinear derivatives in the hedge portfolio.   
Examining the results from the Tobit and the ordered Probit regressions, I find that the 
determinants that affect the extent of nonlinear hedging significantly change the 
likelihood of undertaking nonlinear derivatives.  The results in Table 2.19 indicate 
positive coefficients on firm size, market-to-book assets, leverage, and leverage indicator.  
The relations for firm size and market-to-book assets are significant at the 1% level.  The 
relation with leverage is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  The 
coefficient on industry-adjusted leverage is significant at the 5%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  These findings suggest that larger firms, firms with enhanced investment  
opportunities, or firms facing a higher probability of financial distress are more likely to 
use nonlinear instruments.  I find an inverse relation between nonlinear usage and CEO 
tenure (significant at 1% in model 2).   
The findings are generally consistent with my hypotheses.  The results for firm 
size supports the notion that larger firms have more resources to employ sophisticated 
personnel and thus are more likely to administer sophisticated devices.  The results for 









Probit Regression Results – The Likelihood of Nonlinear Usage 
The dependent variable corresponds to zero if a firm does not use nonlinear vehicles at all 
and one otherwise. Coefficients represent marginal effects.  Firm size is the log of the 
market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to the 
book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm size.  Leverage 
Indicator is an indicator variable.  The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the 
firm’s leverage ratio is greater than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss 
Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free 
Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of 
three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  P-values are in parentheses.  
Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
 
























































































































nonlinear hedging to take advantage of the upside potential.  The results for leverage and 
leverage indicator indicate that firms with more risky debt have stronger incentives to 
adopt nonlinear instruments to lower the costs of underinvestment.  A possible 
explanation for the negative sign on CEO tenure is that more tenured CEOs are less likely 
to invest any effort to understand more complex nonlinear derivative contracts.  I also 
estimate binominal Probit models to provide additional evidence on the relation between 
the likelihood of nonlinear hedging and firm characteristics.  The dependent variable 
corresponds to zero if a firm does not use nonlinear vehicles at all and one otherwise.   
Table 2.20 shows that the binomial results are consistent with those from ordered 
Probit regressions.  I find that the likelihood of undertaking nonlinear instruments 
increases with firm size (significant at 1%), market-to-book assets (significant at 1%), 
leverage (significant at 1%, 5%, and 1% respectively), and leverage indicator (significant 
at 10%, 10%, and 5% respectively).  Moreover, the results on CEO tenure from 
binominal Probit regressions (significant at the 10% and 1% levels in models 1 and 2) are 
similar to but more significant than those from ordered Probit models (significant at the 
level in model 2).   
Table 2.21 and Table 2.22 provide additional support for the underinvestment 
hypothesis.  Regressions 2 and 3 in Table 2.21 provide evidence that the likelihood that a 
firm will use nonlinear contracts is decreasing in the level of coverage ratio (significant at 
the 1% and 10% levels respectively) but increasing in that of convertible debt (significant 
at 1%).  Table 2.22 (model 2) suggests that the negative relation with Z-score is 









Ordered Probit Results - Analysis of the Derivative Users (Coverage Measure) 
The dependent variable is coded zero if the firm uses linear derivative instruments only.  
It is one if the firm uses both linear and nonlinear derivatives.  It is two if the firm uses 
only nonlinear devices.  Firm size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-
Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt 
scaled by firm size.  Coverage ratio is defined as earnings before depreciation scaled by 
interest. Convertible Debt is convertible debt scaled by firm size. Tax Loss 
Carryforwards is the book value of tax loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free 
Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of 
three-year return on equity prior to the decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years 
since the CEO has been in position.  P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at 
the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
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Ordered Probit Regression - Analysis of the Derivative Users (Z-score Measure) 
The dependent variable is coded zero if the firm uses linear derivative instruments only.  
It is one if the firm uses both linear and nonlinear derivatives.  It is two if the firm uses 
only nonlinear devices.  Firm size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-
Book Assets is the ratio of the market value to total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt 
scaled by firm size.  Z-score is a probability of bankruptcy.  Convertible Debt is 
convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Tax Loss Carryforwards is the book value of tax 
loss carryforwards divided by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to 
firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity prior to the 
decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.  
P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
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the 10% level.  Taken together, these findings are consistent with the underinvestment 
hypotheses but inconsistent with the risk- shifting notion.      
Table 2.23 and Table 2.24 present ordered Probit regressions results on the 
subsample of major and minor hedgers, respectively.  Compared with those in Table 
2.19, the results provide several interesting observations.  First, both the major hedger 
and the typical hedger that have large total assets, or greater investment opportunities are 
more likely to include nonlinear derivatives in their hedge portfolios.  Second, the 
likelihood that both the major hedger and the typical hedger adopt nonlinear instruments 
is decreasing in CEO’s tenure.  Third, unlike the typical firm, the major hedger that has 
more free cash flow is more likely to undertake nonlinear devices.  Finally, both the 
minor hedger and the typical hedger that have higher financial leverage or larger total 
assets are more likely to use nonlinear contracts.      
Although the data limit analysis on the firms that use only interest rate or currency 
derivatives, I have no reason to believe that the results for firms that use commodity 
derivatives would be different.  Like commodity price movements, the exchange rate or 
interest rate behavior over time will alter a company’s future revenues and costs, and 
therefore affect a firm’s production or investment decisions.  In fact, corporate use of 
interest rate and currency derivatives is significantly greater than that of commodity 
derivative contracts.  For example, Geczy, et al. (1995) find that during 1993, 52.1% of 
Fortunate 500 non-financial firms use currency derivatives, 44.2% use interest rate 
derivatives, and only 11.3% use commodity derivatives.   Thus, my sample represents the 









Ordered Probit Results - Analysis of Hedging Strategies, among Major Hedgers 
The firm is considered a major hedger if the fraction of its total assets hedged exceeds the 
median (0.07) of the 382 sample firms.  The dependent variable is zero if the firm uses 
linear derivative instruments only.  It is one if the firm uses both linear and nonlinear 
derivatives.  The dependent variable is two if the firm uses only nonlinear devices.  Firm 
size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm 
size.  The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater 
than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt 
is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to 
firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity prior to the 
decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.  
P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
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Ordered Probit Results - Analysis of Hedging Strategies, among Minor Hedgers 
The firm is considered a minor hedger if the fraction of its total assets hedged is less than 
the median (0.07) of the 382 sample firms.  The dependent variable is zero if the firm 
uses linear derivative instruments only.  It is one if the firm uses both linear and nonlinear 
derivatives.  The dependent variable is two if the firm uses only nonlinear devices.  Firm 
size is the log of the market value of the firm.  Market-to-Book Assets is the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is long-term debt scaled by firm 
size.  The value of the indicator variable is set to one if the firm’s leverage ratio is greater 
than the average of its two-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise.  Convertible Debt 
is convertible debt scaled by firm size.  Free Cash Flow is the ratio of free cash flow to 
firm size.  Return on Equity is the average of three-year return on equity prior to the 
decision year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been in position.  
P-values are in parentheses.  Results significant at the ten percent level or less are in bold.  
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Summary of the Empirical Results 
The table summaries selected multivariate results.  The method column indicates the type of multivariate analysis that I perform.  Sample identifies 
the population from which I draw the sample.  Dependent Variable identifies the variable that I use to quantify the extent of nonlinear/linear 
hedging.  The other columns summarize the variables, and the predicted signs.  Results that are consistent with the hypotheses are in parentheses.    
      
Method Sample Dependent 
Variable 





Tobit All Nonlinear/asset Market/Book  (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow (+) CEO Tenure (−) Leverage + 
         CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) (+) 
             
             
Tobit All Nonlinear/size Market/Book  (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow (+) CEO Tenure (−) Leverage (+) 
         CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) + 
             
             
Tobit All Linear/asset Market/Book − Ln (size) − Free cash flow (+) CEO Tenure + Leverage (−) 
         CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) − 
             
             
Tobit All Linear/size Market/Book (−) Ln (size) − Free cash flow + CEO Tenure + Leverage − 
         CEO Age (+/−) Leverage (0/1) − 
             
             
Tobit All Intensity Nonlinear Market/Book (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow + CEO Tenure (−) Leverage (+) 
         CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) (+) 
           Coverage  (−) 
           Z-score (−) 
             
             
Tobit Major Intensity Nonlinear Market/Book (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow (+) CEO Tenure (−) Leverage (+) 
 Hedger        CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) + 
             









             
             
(Table 2.25 Continued) 
 
 
Method  Sample Dependent 
Variable 





Tobit Minor Intensity Nonlinear Market/Book (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow + CEO Tenure − Leverage (+) 
 Hedger        CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) + 
             
             
Ordered All Intensity Nonlinear Market/Book (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow + CEO Tenure (−) Leverage (+) 
Probit         CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) (+) 
           Coverage  (−) 
           Z-score (−) 
             
             
Ordered Major Intensity Nonlinear Market/Book (+) Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow (+) CEO Tenure (−) Leverage + 
Probit Hedger        CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) + 
             
             
Ordered Minor Intensity Nonlinear Market/Book + Ln (size) (+) Free cash flow + CEO Tenure     − Leverage (+) 
Probit Hedger        CEO Age +/− Leverage (0/1) + 
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2.6.5  Summaries of Multivariate Results 
Table 2.25 summaries the multivariate results.  It summarizes the method, the 
sample, the dependent variable, and the predicted signs of the explanatory variables. 
The results that are consistent with the hypotheses are in parentheses.     
2.7  Conclusions 
In this chapter, I examine the determinants of corporate use of linear and 
nonlinear derivatives from the perspective of managers and shareholders.  The results 
of cross-sectional regressions using Tobit and Probit models indicate that both 
managerial incentives and value maximization explain why firms use linear or 
nonlinear derivatives.  In particular, I find that nonlinear usage is positively related to 
investment opportunity, free cash flow, firm size, stock option grants, and the 
prospect of financial distress.  I document a negative relation between the use of 
nonlinear derivatives and bonus plan and CEO tenure.  My empirical analysis is 
partly exploratory due to the lack of a specific theoretical framework.    
Supporting the notion that managerial incentives influence the choice of 
derivative instruments, I document a positive relation between nonlinear derivative 
usage and stock option grants, but a negative relation between the use of nonlinear 
derivative contracts and bonus compensation.  These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers with more option grants have greater incentives to use 
derivatives that have nonlinear payoffs to raise their expected compensation.  The 
“stair-step” function of bonus payments discourages managers whose bonus 
payments are adjacent to the cap from undertaking nonlinear derivatives.  These 
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findings suggest that hedging policies reflect the incentives provided in compensation 
contracts.  Inefficient contracts lead to inefficient policies.   
I document a negative relation between the use of nonlinear devices and CEO 
tenure.  One interpretation of this result is that more tenure CEOs are more risk averse 
and thus have greater incentives to use linear derivative instruments to eliminate the 
variation in cash flows or earnings.  Alternatively, managers with longer tenures are 
closer to retirement and thus possibly lack the incentives to understand the more 
sophisticated derivatives that have nonlinear payoffs.  This result suggests that 
managerial risk aversion or management’s lack of famility with sophisticated 
financial instrument impedes nonlinear derivative usage.    
My evidence indicates that the use of nonlinear hedging is positively related to 
investment opportunity.  This evidence suggests that firms with more investment 
opportunities have greater incentives to use derivatives that can preserve upside 
potential for shareholders.  Linear derivative securities eliminate downside risk but 
also upside potential, resulting in the potential loss of growth opportunities.   
Additionally, my results provide evidence that nonlinear usage increases with 
firm size.  This evidence supports the concept that larger firms have more resources 
to invest in complex control systems and personnel capable of administering more 
sophisticated nonlinear instruments.  This evidence suggests that corporations facing 
more financial constraints are less likely to use nonlinear derivative instruments.   
My results also shed light on the relation between the use of nonlinear 
vehicles and internal capital.  I document that the notional values of both linear and 
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nonlinear derivative contracts and the component of nonlinear devices in the firm’s 
hedge portfolio increase in the level of free cash flow.  These results suggest that a 
substantial cost differential between internal cash and external capital precludes firms 
lacking financial slack from undertaking derivatives or using nonlinear devices.   
Finally, I provide evidence on the relation between capital structure and 
nonlinear derivative usage.  I document a positive relation between nonlinear usage 
and the likelihood of financial distress, measured as leverage, industry-adjusted 
leverage, Z-score, and coverage ratio.  These findings support the premise that firms 
use nonlinear derivative contracts to mitigate the underinvestment problem but also 
preserve upside potential for shareholders. I do not observe an inverse relation 
between the use of nonlinear devices and convertible debt.  The evidence is not 
consistent with the notion that firms use nonlinear instruments to engage in risk-
shifting behavior.      
My findings have several implications for corporate policy.  At the most basic 
level, the results suggest that firms with larger growth opportunities should use 
nonlinear derivatives to protect against downside losses but preserve growth potential 
for shareholders.  However, managers establish hedging policies to protect the values 
of their own wealth.  Compensation committees should take care that managers’ 
incentive compensation contracts are also in the best interests of shareholders.  
Additionally, CEOs who have been in their position for a long time become 
entrenched and potentially too risk averse.   As these CEOs approach retirement, they 
also face shorter horizons.  Thus, long-tenured CEOs have the incentives to engage in 
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sub-optimal hedging policies.  Firms should be aware of this problem and possibly 
use incentive compensation or monitoring mechanisms to mitigate these potential 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers.    
The data also suggests that firms can protect valuable financial slack with 
derivatives, which should lower their cost of capital by limiting the need to raise 
external funds.  As financial slack increases, firms should consider using some of 
these internal funds to purchase nonlinear derivatives, which can preserve both 
financial slack and upside potential for shareholders.  Finally, firms that face the 
prospect of financial distress can use nonlinear derivatives to mitigate the 
underinvestment problem associated with a debt overhang.  All in all, the results 
suggest that an effective corporate hedging policy, combined with a proper incentive 
compensation system, can increase firm value by mitigating agency problems and 
lowering the cost of capital for the firm. 




A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STACKED HEDGE 
HEDGING FLOWS IN COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT ASSETS 
 
3.1   Introduction  
 MG Refining & Marketing (MGRM), the U.S. subsidiary of a German 
industrial giant Metallgesellschaft A. G. (MG), reported its derivatives-related losses 
of $1.3 billion in late 1993 and early 1994.  MGRM’s derivatives activities were in 
fact part of its marketing/hedging program sometime referred to as “synthetic 
storage.”  MGRM committed itself to supply gasoline and heating oil to end-users 
over the next ten years at fixed prices.  In order to insulate the profit margins in its 
fixed-price commitment from its exposure to spot price increases, MGRM took long 
positions in derivatives contracts.  During 1993, MGRM established very large 
derivative positions in crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline that were roughly 80 times 
the daily output of Kuwait.   
 The most efficient way for MGRM to eliminate all risks was to buy a strip of 
forward contracts corresponding to the maturity of a delivery date and the quantity of 
gasoline and oil scheduled for delivery on that date.  If MGRM had implemented a 
strip hedge, it would have had no exposure to oil prices.  Nevertheless, a strip hedge 
may have been prohibitively expensive to execute.  A strip hedge requires using 
contracts from over-the-counter markets characterized by limited liquidity. Since 
most contracts tended to be of short maturity, MGRM hedged its long-term exposures 
by sequentially stacking nearby futures contracts until the end of its hedging horizon.  
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MGRM suffered tremendous losses in its derivatives position in the autumn of 1993 
when oil prices declined.  Since it was unable to meet maintenance margins, the paper 
losses have to be realized. 
  The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate how well a long-term exposure to 
asset prices can be neutralized using a stacked hedge rather than a strip hedge.  This 
chapter examines the hedging problem facing the agent as discussed in Hilliard 
(1999).  The agent has long-term deterministic commodity supply commitments and 
wishes to hedge those long-term exposures by repeatedly rolling nearby futures 
contracts until settlement.  This issue has been addressed theoretically in the 
literature.  A collection of articles may be found in Culp and Miller (1999).  The 
approach here is to examine competing models and to test their predictions using 
empirical data on both investment and commercial assets.    
 Commercial commodities are those held for use in production processes or for 
ultimate consumption.  They include, for example, agricultural, metal, and energy 
commodities.  Investment assets are held solely for investment purposes and include 
stocks, fixed income securities and money market securities.  Convenience yield is a 
type of yield found in commercial assets but not in investments.  Marginal 
convenience yield is the benefit which one derives from holding the commodity 
physically.  It reflects the market’s expectations regarding the future availability of 
the commodity.  Low inventories tend to contribute to high convenience yields.  On 
the other hand, the expectation of a surplus of the commodity tends to lead to low 
convenience yields.  Fama and French (1987) find that the marginal convenience 
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yields of most agricultural and animal products vary seasonally. Fama and French 
(1988) examine the metals futures contracts traded on the London Metals Exchange 
and provide empirical evidence that the convenience yield of metals follows a mean-
reverting process.  Gibson and Schwartz (1990) develop a two-factor model to value 
oil-linked assets under the assumption that the cash price of oil and the convenience 
yield of oil follow a joint stochastic process.  Their empirical results demonstrate that 
the model performs well in valuing short-term contracts such as futures.  Schwartz 
(1997) reveals that there is strong mean reversion of convenience yield for copper and 
oil, but not for gold, which Hull (2000) considers an investment asset.    
This chapter develops and tests the hypothesis that stacked hedges perform 
better with investment assets than with commercial commodities.  The effectiveness 
of the stacked-hedge depends on hedged assets obeying spot-futures parity.  
Investment assets closely obey spot-futures parity.  Commercial commodities do not.  
Deviations from spot-futures parity are a result of stochastic net convenience yields.  
Since investment assets have little or no convenience yields while commercial 
commodities have non-trivial convenience yields, stacked hedges should perform 
better with investment assets than with commercial commodities.   
The strip hedge is used as a benchmark of multi-period hedging accuracy.  
The strip hedge uses a portfolio of futures contracts of different maturities to match 
required outflows or inflows.  Under price convergence and liquidation of contracts at 
maturity, future cash flows will be completely determined.  This is assumed to be the 
optimal hedging strategy, net of liquidity and transaction cost considerations.  While 
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not specifically matching maturities, Neuberger (1999) shows that hedging of 
commercial contracts can be greatly improved by using futures contracts of several 
maturities simultaneously.  He studies the crude oil contracts traded on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYSE) and finds that the quality of the hedge is improved if 
contracts of more maturities are used.    
  Three commercial commodities and three investment assets are examined.  
The commercial commodities, presumably with non-trivial convenience yield, are 
heating oil, light crude oil, and unleaded gasoline. The investment assets are the 
British Pound, Deutsche Mark, and Swiss Franc.  My empirical evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that stacked hedges perform better with investment assets than 
with commercial commodities.  The stacked hedge produces an R2 of at least 0.98 for 
investment assets. However, the mean hedge performance for commercial 
commodities range from less than 0.83 for heating oil to 0.96 for unleaded gasoline.  I 
also document that the significant differences in hedge performance between the two 
classes of assets are attributed to the stochastic nature of marginal convenience yields 
of commercial commodities.         
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 develops 
five candidate hedging models for implementing the stacked hedge.  Section 3.3 
describes techniques used to estimate the parameters of hedging models.  Section 3.4 
describes the data and presents empirical evidence.  Section 3.5 concludes the 
chapter.                
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3.2 Hedging Models 
  This section derives and/or reviews the path of hedge ratios and hedged cash 
flows for each of the five models.  The first model follows from Hilliard’s (1999) 
setup.  The second model extends the first model by allowing for variable but non-
stochastic instantaneous net convenience yield.  The third model imposes additional 
assumptions on the first model and develops the framework for investigating the 
sources of errors in the stacked hedge.  The fourth model uses time-series regression 
to derive the new hedge path and the last model is the naïve scheme used by MGRM. 
3.2.1 Model 1 
  Hilliard (1999) posits an agent who has long-term deterministic flow 
commitments and who wishes to hedge those long-term exposures by repeatedly 
rolling short-dated futures contracts of the same maturity until the hedging horizon 
ends.  The hedging problem is as follows: an agent sells or buys the underlying 
commodity in each of the n-periods at the prevailing spot price and wishes to hedge 
his flows using traded futures contracts.  Hilliard (1999) derives the optimal hedging 
path for the agent.   
 The model is set in discrete time.  The agent faces an n-period hedging 
horizon with deterministic product flow mi, at times ti, i = 1, 2,…, n.  At the beginning 
of each period a new futures contract starts trading and it matures exactly one period 
later.  When one futures contract matures, another is introduced; this process 
continues until the end of the multi-period hedge.  At the end of each period, futures 
positions are unwound and the generated cash from spot and futures positions is 
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deposited into an account at the riskless interest rate until the end of the hedge period.  
P(t) is the spot price at time t and F(t, T) is the price at time t of the futures contract 
that settles at time T.  For simplicity, the price of the contract at initiation is denoted 
as Fi and the price at maturity as Fi,i.  The change in the futures price is ∆Fi = Fi,i - Fi  
and ∆Pi = Pi+1 - Pi  is the change in spot price.  For convenience, let t0 = 0 and ti = i * 
∆ where ∆ is time between flow events.  The problem facing an agent is to find the 
optimal hedging path xi, i = 0, 1, 2,…, n-1 so that Var(Vk) is minimized, where Vk is 









The following assumptions are made implicitly and explicitly in the model: 
Assumption 1. The market is frictionless, i.e., there are no transaction costs or taxes, 
information is freely available and participants are price takers.  Futures contracts are 
cash settled and no margins are required.       
Assumption 2. The interest rates and the instantaneous net convenience yields are 
known and constant over time.   
Assumption 3. The hedge path xk, xk+1,,…, xn-1, is independent of past hedge 
parameters x0, x1, …, xk-1.  
Assumption 4.  The agent can borrow or lend at the riskless rate.   
Assumption 5.  The cost-of-carry model in the form Fi = Pi exp (b∆) holds, where the 
cost of carry b equals the riskless interest rate γ minus the instantaneous net 
convenience yield δ.       
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Assumption 6.  Price convergence in the form of Fi,i = Pi+1 holds.      











 gives risk-free cash flows at the end of period n.  Neglecting compounding terms, 
notice that this is the same result as the naïve stacked hedge since *kx  at period k is the 
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3.2.2  Model 2 
 The hedge path derived in Hilliard (1999) is based on an assumption that 
instantaneous net convenience yields are known and constant over time. The theory 
of storage of Brennan (1958), Telser (1958), and Working (1949) posits that marginal 
convenience yield is a decreasing function of the level of inventories of the 
commodity.  Marginal convenience yield is a measure of the benefits that may 
include the ability to keep production running.  It reflects the market’s expectations 
regarding the future availability of the commodity.  Low stocks held tend to 
contribute to high convenience yields.  On the other hand, the expectation of a surplus 
of the commodity tends to lead to low convenience yields.  More recent papers 
including Fama and French (1987, 1988), Gibson and Schwartz (1989, 1990), and 
Schwartz (1997), and Hilliard and Reis (1998) also note that convenience yield 
follows a mean-reverting process.  
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 Model 2 relaxes the assumption that instantaneous net convenience yield 
remains constant over time.  Instead, I allow for an arbitrary term structure.  The spot 
price and the nearby futures price of the underlying asset are used to derive the 
forward cost-of-carry.  However, I must assume that the cost-of-carry for a given 
calendar date remains constant, else future hedge ratios are random and the variance 
calculations become intractable.     
 The new hedge path when cost-of-carry is a deterministic function of 
instantaneous net convenience yield follows the setup of Hilliard (1999).   
 Using equation (1), the one-period model facing the agent becomes: 
(4) ).()( 1111 −−−− ∆+== nnnnnn FxPmVarVVarL  
Differentiating Ln-1 solving for the critical point gives 
.)5( * 1 nn mx −=−  
Similarly, the two-period problem is 
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*
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Using equation (5) in equation (6) and take the derivative of equation (6) with respect 
to xn-2 giving the critical point 
],)exp[()7( 1
*
2 ∆−−−= −− rbmmx nnnn  
where .iperiodatbeginningrateforwardperiodonetheisbn −−  The one-period 
rate is computed from i-period rates by recursion as  
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Using equation (5), (7) in equation (9) and solving the first order condition gives the 
critical point  
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3.2.3 Model 3 
 Models 1 and 2 assume that interest rates are constant.  If short-term interest 
rates are not constant, the optimal hedge path and terminal cash flows are impacted.  
The third model extends the first one by allowing for both convenience yield and 
interest rates to be stochastic.  By imposing additional covariance assumptions from 
the first model, a tractable closed form solution is obtained for the optimal hedge path 
and hedged cash flows.  More importantly, this model gives us insights into why the 
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stacked hedges perform better with investment assets than with commercial 
commodities.      















jj ∀== β  
Assumption 8.   Prices are orthogonal to residuals from the cost-of-carry model.  That 
is, .,0),( jiPPFCov jii ∀=− β    
 All covariance expressions are conditioned on information available at prior 
periods k < j.  Hedged cash flows forthcoming from period k+1 through period n can 





− ∆+⋅−⋅∆= ∑ iii
n
ki





fwhere inini  The n-i period forward rate 
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 The first part of equation (18) is deterministic while the second part contains 
random terms.  Stacked hedges are therefore effective when the second part of the 
equation is vanishingly small.  If the second term vanishes completely, the stacked 
hedge is equivalent to the strip hedge.  Commercial commodities generally have 
positive convenience yields.  The convenience yields, as discussed above, have a 
mean-reverting tendency and in any event requires a stochastic representation.  This 
implies that assumption 7 does not necessarily hold and that some or all terms 
containing )( ii PF β− are non-zero. More specifically, )( ii PF β− captures the 
stochastic nature of the marginal convenience yield.  As a result, stacked hedges with 
commercial commodities would not perform as well as strip hedges.  On the other 
hand, investment assets have little or no convenience yield.  This implies that the 
assumptions of model 3 generally remain valid and therefore stacked hedges with 
investment assets perform almost as well as strip hedges.  In fact, if the assumptions 
hold perfectly, the stacked hedge results in completely hedged future cash flows.    
3.2.4 Model 4 
 Model 4 is a one-period, myopic model.  Therefore, interest rates and 
convenience yields are of no consequence so long as there is price convergence. 
However, applying this model in a multi-period context requires the assumption that 
the hedge ratio is invariant over time.  Previous research on the derivation of the 
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optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness of futures contracts is largely related to 
the covariance between the changes in spot and futures prices and the variances of 
futures price changes (Ederington, 1979, and Hill and Schneeweis, 1981 and 1982). 
However, these studies are restricted to a one-period world.  More realistically, 
hedging strategy should be implemented dynamically so that the agent has to roll the 
hedge as old futures contracts mature and new futures contracts are available.  The 
purpose of this model is to apply the optimal hedge ratio derived from a one-period 
world to a multi-period world. 
Following the terminology and approach of Ederington (1979), consider an 
agent who wishes to minimize the variance of portfolio return. In this context, an 
agent who enters the market in one period to buy is “short”.  The portfolio return is 
written  
  ,)19( FXPXR FS ∆+∆=   
where SX  = -m and FX  are units held in the spot and futures market, respectively.  In 
order to maximize expected quadratic utility, the agent minimizes return variance, 
written as: 
   (20) ),(2)()()( 22 FPCovXXFVarXPVarXRVar FSFS ∆∆+∆+∆=   
The first order condition with respect to the futures position, FX , is 







−=   
  The hedge ratio ( 1a ) is typically estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method.  Three theoretical specifications of the cash and futures prices are used to 
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estimate the hedge ratio.  First, the price level model regresses the spot price on the 
futures price to estimate for the hedge ratio.  Witt, Schroeder, and Hayenga (1987) 
provide empirical support for this specification.  Second, the price change model 
regresses the change in the spot price against the change in the futures price. Hill and 
Schneeweis (1981, 1982) and others use this specification.  Finally, the percentage 
change in the spot price is regressed on the percentage change in the futures price.   
 Based on the setup of Ederington (1979), I use the price change model to 
estimate the optimal hedge ratio in a one-period world.  The value of x* is equivalent 
to the slope coefficient of a time-series regression of spot price changes on futures 
price changes.  Specifically, the following time-series regression is considered: 
  .)()22( 1101 iiiii FFaaPP ε+−+=− −−  
 The optimal hedge position in a one-period world is used in the multi-period 
stacked hedge strategy assuming that the hedge ratio 1a  remains constant.  When km  







)( units in nearby futures contracts at the 
beginning of time period i. At the end of the period, the agent reverses the futures 
position.  This process is continued throughout the agent’s hedging horizon.        
  3.2.5   Model 5 
  This model is based on the naïve scheme used by MGRM.  The agent enters 
positions in the nearby futures contracts that equal the sum of the remaining flow 
commitments.  As time evolves, the agent rebalances the hedging portfolio and rolls 
forward in a similar fashion until the end of the hedging horizon.   
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3.3 Parameter Estimation 
 The state variables, or factors, in the empirical implementation of Model 3 are 
frequently not directly observable.  For example, the instantaneous interest rate is not 
directly observed.  In the absence of arbitrage, forward interest rates can be derived 
from the yield curve of Treasury Bills.  The parameter β can be estimated by time-
series regression of the form 
(23) iii ePF ++= βα .   
   Classical statistical inference is valid if both { iF } and { iP } are stationary. 
However, most financial time series such as price series are non-stationary. To 
examine stationarity, the augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) procedure is used to test for 
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j aa βγ and ε, γ are well-behaved residuals. The 
appropriate lag length n is selected by starting with a maximum lag of 12 and the 
model is pared down by the usual t-test and F-tests.  Once a tentative lag length has 
been determined, we ensure that the Ljung-Box Q-statistic reveals no significant 
autocorrelations among residuals.  When testing for unit root, the null hypothesis is 
that if γ = 0, the system has a unit root.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the series are stationary.   
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 If both price series are stationary, the parameter β is estimated directly.  When 
both series are non-stationary and is integrated of order 1, Engle and Granger’s 
(1987) method is used to test whether they are cointegrated.  If the two series are 
cointegrated, =ie ii PF βα −−  must be stationary.  A Dickey-Fuller test is performed 
on the residual  
.1)26( iii eae ε+=∆ −
∧∧
   
If the null hypothesis 0=a  is accepted, the { iF } and { iP } sequences are analyzed as 
if they are not cointegrated and the first difference of equation (23) is used to estimate 
β: 
.)27( iii ePaF ∆+∆+=∆ β    
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As before, the appropriate lag length is selected by starting with a maximum lag of 12 
and the model is pared down by the usual t-test and F-tests.  Once a tentative lag 
length has been determined, we ensure that the Ljung-Box Q-statistic reveals no 
significant autocorrelations among residuals.  If ,02 <<− a  I conclude that the 
residual sequence is stationary and { iF } and { iP } are CI (1,1).  
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  Engle and Granger (1987) show that if the series are cointegrated, there exists 
an error correction representation of the series.  Specifically, if { iF } and { iP } are CI 













−− ∑∑  
Lag lengths are determined using an F test that all jγ = 0 and kδ = 0. The parameter β 
is then estimated. 
3.4   Data and Empirical Results 
  Data was obtained from Futures Industry Institute. The data consist of 
observations of settlement and cash prices for three commercial commodities and 
three investment assets.  The commercial commodities are heating oil, light crude oil, 
and unleaded gasoline.  The investment assets include the British Pound, Deutsche 
Mark, and Swiss Franc.  Monthly observations are available for heating oil, light 
crude oil, and unleaded gasoline.  Quarterly observations are available for the British 
Pound, Deutsche Mark, and Swiss Franc.  The heating oil, light crude oil, and 
unleaded gasoline futures contracts are traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYME).  The British Pound, Deutsche Mark, and Swiss Franc futures contracts are 
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).    
 In general, available data series for futures contracts is comparatively recent 
and therefore short.  The data on heating oil futures contracts consist of the period 
November 1979 - May 2001.  The light crude oil data is available for the period 
November 1983 - May 2001.  The sample period for unleaded gasoline is January 
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1985 - April 2001.  The Deutsche Mark data covers the period December 1975 - 
September 1999.  The data are available from December 1975 - June 2001 for the 
British Pound and Swiss Franc.   
  Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the spot prices series and the futures 
prices series.  This table reports sample sizes, mean prices, standard deviations of 
prices, skewness, and kurtosis.  The volatility of spot prices appears to be quite 
similar to the futures series.  For example, the standard deviation of spot prices for 
light crude oil is 5.459 and that of futures prices for light crude oil is only 5.195.  The 
standard deviation of heating oil, the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark and Swiss 
Franc differ in only the third significant place.  Although test statistics are not 
computed, the distributions are noticeably non-normal.  Skewness and kurtosis of the 
normal is 0 and 3, respectively.  Distributions of all prices series are positively 
skewed except for the series of the Deutsche Mark and the Swiss Franc.  The sample 
kurtosis coefficients never exceed one and indicate that both the spot prices and the 
futures prices are not normally distributed.  Most notable is the similarity in all of the 
statistics between spot and future prices.        
 Table 3.2 reports the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root. 
The parameters of model 1 and model 2 are estimated for the spot price series and the 
futures price series, respectively.  The numbers of observations are reported in the 
column labeled T.  The chosen lag lengths are reported in the column n.  The 
estimated values 0a , t( 0a ), γ , and t(γ ) are reported in columns 4, 5, 6, and 7, 
respectively.  Under the null of nonstationary, I use the MacKinnon critical values.      
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Table 3.1 














Spot Prices      
    Heating Oil 258 0.641 0.178 0.436 -0.845 
    Light Crude Oil 210         21.121 5.459 0.626 -0.280 
    Unleaded Gasoline 195           0.601 0.144 0.876   0.820 
    British Pound 102 1.685 0.242 0.708   0.859 
    Deutsche Mark   95 0.525 0.103       -0.291  -0.895 
    Swiss Franc 102 0.608 0.128       -0.151  -0.755 
      
Futures Prices      
    Heating Oil 258 0.634 0.176 0.491 -0.771 
    Light Crude Oil 210         20.918 5.195 0.622 -0.311 
    Unleaded Gasoline 195           0.594 0.133 0.815   0.679 
    British Pound 102 1.677 0.240 0.741   0.922 
    Deutsche Mark   95 0.527 0.102       -0.315 -0.843 
    Swiss Franc 102 0.613 0.127       -0.163         -0.663 
 
The data on heating oil futures contracts are available from the period November 1979 - May 2001.  The light crude oil 
data consists of the period November 1983 - May 2001.   The sample period for unleaded gasoline is January 1985 – 
April 2001. The Deutsche Mark data cover the period December 1975 - September 1999.  The data are available from 
December 1975 – June 2001 for both the British Pound and the Swiss Franc.        
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As can been seen from inspection of Table 3.2, the estimated values of γ  for both the 
spot series and the futures series of heating oil, unleaded gasoline, the British Pound, the 
Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss Franc are not statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level.  Only the spot prices and the futures series of light crude oil have an estimated 
value of γ  that is significant different from zero at the 5% level.  This suggest that both 
{Pi} and {Fi} of only light crude oil are stationary.   
 Table 3.3 reports the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root in 
the autoregressive representations of the first difference of the series data of heating oil, 
unleaded gasoline, the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss Franc.  The 
estimated values of γ in all series data are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
This evidence suggests that {Pi} and {Fi} of heating oil, unleaded gasoline, the British 
Pound, the Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss Franc are integrated of order 1 (i.e. I(1)). 
 Table 3.4 summarizes the estimation of the parameter β for light crude oil.  Since 
both { iP } and iF{ } of light crude oil are respectively stationary, the standard regression, 
,iii ePF ++= βα is used to estimate the parameter β.  The estimated coefficient β of Pi  
equals 0.944.  The adjusted 2R  of the model is approximately 98.5%.   
 Table 3.5 presents the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the Residuals 
for Cointegration.  Table 3.3 indicated that both { iP } and iF{ } of heating oil, unleaded 
gasoline, the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss Franc are integrated of 
order one.  Therefore, it is imperative to investigate whether { iP } and iF{ } are 
cointegrated of order (1,1).  The column labeled T displays the numbers of observations.  
The chosen lag lengths are reported in the column n .   The estimated values and t( a ) are   
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Table 3.2 







jii PPaPModel ηβγ +∆++=∆ −
=
− ∑  
Series (Spot Price) T n  0a  t( 0a ) γ  t(γ ) 
Heating Oil 247 10 0.036 2.032 -0.058  -2.078 
Light Crude Oil 208   1 1.674 2.819 -0.079 -2.919* 
Unleaded Gasoline 191   3 0.061 2.625 -0.101  -2.668 
British Pound   97   4 0.139 1.975 -0.084  -2.026 
Deutsche Mark   86   8 0.030 1.691 -0.056  -1.695 






jii FFaFModel εβγ +∆++=∆ −
=
− ∑  
Series (Futures Price) T n  0a  t( 0a ) γ  t(γ ) 
Heating Oil 249 8 0.023 1.568 -0.036  -1.599 
Light Crude Oil 208 1 1.505 2.811 -0.072 -2.897* 
Unleaded Gasoline 182     12 0.068 2.334 -0.115  -2.285 
British Pound   97 4 0.135 1.982 -0.082  -2.029 
Deutsche Mark   86 8 0.031 1.733 -0.058  -1.740 
Swiss Franc   97 4 0.053 2.465 -0.083  -2.448 
T is the number of observations.  n is the chosen lag length.  t( 0a )  and t(γ ) are the ratios of the 
OLS estimates of 0a and γ to their respective standard errors.  Under the null of nonstationary, 
we use MacKinnon critical values. The value of t(γ ) denoted by an (*) is smaller than the 5% 
one tail critical value of the distribution of t(γ ).   
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Table 3.3 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots in the autoregressive representations 









jii PPaPModel ηβγ +∆+∆+=∆ −
=
− ∑  
Series (Spot Price) T n  0a  t( 0a ) γ  t(γ ) 
Heating Oil 246 10 0.000 0.007 -1.476 -4.741* 
Unleaded Gasoline 190   3 0.000 0.127 -1.460  -8.475* 
British Pound  96   4   -0.003   -0.373 -0.991  -4.733* 
Deutsche Mark  85   8 0.000 0.095 -0.833  -2.915* 








jii FFaFModel εβγ +∆+∆+=∆ −
=
− ∑  
Series (Futures Price) T n  0a  t( 0a ) γ  t(γ ) 
Heating Oil 248 8 0.000 0.122 -1.459 -6.422* 
Unleaded Gasoline 181     12 0.003 0.721 -1.278  -4.088* 
British Pound   96 4   -0.003   -0.355 -0.958  -4.678* 
Deutsche Mark   85 8 0.000 0.081 -0.803 -2.907* 
Swiss Franc   96 4 0.001 0.416 -0.870 -4.051* 
T is the number of observations.  n is the chosen lag length.  t( 0a )  and t(γ ) are the ratios of the 
OLS estimates of 0a and γ to their respective standard errors.  Under the null of nonstationary, 
we use MacKinnon critical values. The value of t(γ ) denoted by an (*) are smaller than the 5% 
one tail critical value of the distribution of t(γ ).   
 




Estimation of the parameter β for Light Crude Oil 
 
.: iii ePFModel ++= βα  
Series T α  t(α ) β  t( β ) 2Radj −  
Crude Oil 210 0.976 5.433 0.944 114.633 0.984 
T is the number of observations.  t(α )  and t( β ) are the ratios of the OLS estimates of α and 
























jii eaeaeModel ε+∆+=∆ −
=
+− ∑  
     Critical   Values
Series  T n  a        t( a ) 1% 5% 10% 
Heating Oil 245 12 -0.567     -3.765* -2.574 -1.940 -1.616 
Unleaded Gasoline 182 12 -0.534     -2.487* -2.576 -1.941 -1.616 
British Pound 100  1 -0.345     -3.852* -2.586 -1.943 -1.617 
Deutsche Mark   90  4 -0.162     -2.427* -2.588 -1.943 -1.617 
Swiss Franc   93  8 -0.189     -2.498* -2.588 -1.943 -1.617 
T is the number of observations.  n is the chosen lag length.  t( a )  is the ratio of the OLS 
estimates of a to its standard error.  Under the null of nonstationary, we use MacKinnon critical 
values.  The value of t( a ) denoted by an (*) are smaller than the 5% one tail critical value of the 
distribution of t( a ) .   
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demonstrated in columns 4, and 5, respectively.  The MacKinnon critical values for 
heating oil, unleaded gasoline, the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss 
Franc at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are reported.  All the deviations from long-run 
equilibrium are found to be stationary.  That is, the { iP } and iF{ } sequences of heating 
oil, unleaded gasoline, the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss Franc are 
cointegrated of order (1,1).   
 Table 3.6 displays the estimation of the parameter β for heating oil, unleaded 
gasoline, the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark, and the Swiss Franc in an error 
correction system.  The parameter β in model 3 is estimated for each of the series.  They 
are 0.740, 0.957, 0.990, 0.835, and 1.014 for heating oil, the British Pound, the Deutsche 
Mark, unleaded gasoline, and the Swiss Franc, respectively.             
 Because of data limitations, a three-period version of Hilliard’s (1999) general 
multi-period model is analyzed.  Specifically, the agent wishes to hedge three-period 
supply commitments with the flow of one unit of commodity per period to maximize 
quadratic utility.  In fact, longer-dated supply commitments are of most interest.  
However, the nature of the dataset imposes limitations on the types of studies that are 
possible.  Ideally, a very long series would be available for testing each hedge path.  The 
performance measurement from each path would constitute one observation.  Repeating 
this procedure for a series of observations would generate sufficient statistics to critically 
evaluate the stacked hedge.  However, a multi-period hedging horizon extending over 
several periods would require several decades of data to obtain a sufficient number of 
independent observations.  In consideration of datasets available, I choose to evaluate the  
three-period hedging performance of the stacked strategy.  With a period being three  
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Table 3.6 
Estimation of the parameter β for Heating Oil, the British Pound, the Deutsche 














− ∑∑  
Series: Heating Oil British Pound  Deutsche Mark 
CONST -0.000 (-0.46) 0.000 (0.76) 0.000 (0.17) 
1−ie  -0.454 (-3.44) -0.413 (-3.78) -0.147 (-2.08) 
iP∆    0.740 (28.07)   0.957 (77.54)   0.990 (96.71) 
1−∆ iF  -0.016 (-0.12) -0.230 (-1.84) -0.301 (-2.45) 
2−∆ iF  0.013 (0.10) -0.193 (-1.57) -0.159 (-1.21) 
3−∆ iF          0.024 (0.20) -0.008 (-0.06) 0.272 (2.15) 
4−∆ iF  -0.072 (-0.63) 0.027 (0.27) 0.056 (0.47) 
5−∆ iF          -0.200 (-1.84)   
6−∆ iF  -0.088 (-0.84)   
7−∆ iF  -0.271 (-2.68)   
8−∆ iF  -0.153 (-1.64)   
9−∆ iF  -0.297 (-3.30)   
10−∆ iF  -0.224 (-2.62)   
11−∆ iF  -0.021 (-0.26)   
12−∆ iF  -0.071 (-1.02)   
1−∆ iP  0.040 (0.32)  0.229 (1.86)  0.303 (2.48) 
2−∆ iP  -0.015 (-0.12)  0.188 (1.53)  0.160 (1.21) 
3−∆ iP  -0.016 (-0.13)  0.010 (0.09)  -0.268 (-2.12) 
4−∆ iP  0.003 (0.03)  -0.030 (-0.30)  -0.058 (-0.50) 
5−∆ iP  0.101 (0.96)   
6−∆ iP  0.066 (0.66)   
7−∆ iP  0.200 (2.12)   
8−∆ iP  0.203 (2.31)   
9−∆ iP  0.278 (3.32)   
10−∆ iP  0.170 (2.15)   
11−∆ iP  0.064 (0.91)   
12−∆ iP  0.032 (0.56)   
T 245 97 90 
2Radj −  0.829 0.986 0.992 
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− ∑∑  
Series: Unleaded Gasoline Swiss Franc  
CONST 0.002 (1.11) -0.000 (-0.84)  
1−ie  -0.332 (-1.97) 0.151 (2.19)  
iP∆    0.835 (26.97)   1.014 (95.06)  
1−∆ iF  -0.447 (-2.59) -0.647 (-5.39)  
2−∆ iF  -0.257 (-1.50) -0.440 (-3.26)  
3−∆ iF  -0.099 (-0.59) 0.038 (0.26)  
4−∆ iF  -0.258 (-1.63) 0.220 (1.49)  
5−∆ iF             -0.327 (-2.16) 0.063 (0.42)  
6−∆ iF  -0.279 (-1.93) 0.084 (0.57)  
7−∆ iF  -0.329 (-2.41) -0.180 (-1.24)  
8−∆ iF  -0.329 (-2.57) -0.265 (-1.82)  
9−∆ iF  -0.217 (-1.82) -0.388 (-2.66)  
10−∆ iF  -0.089 (-0.76) -0.164 (-1.09)  
11−∆ iF  -0.263 (-2.49) 0.095 (0.60)  
12−∆ iF  -0.055 (-0.58) 0.239 (1.78)  
1−∆ iP  0.382 (2.34) 0.670 (5.50)  
2−∆ iP  0.229 (1.42) 0.443 (3.21)  
3−∆ iP  0.110 (0.71) -0.053 (-0.35)  
4−∆ iP  0.222 (1.48) -0.221 (-1.47)  
5−∆ iP  0.223 (1.57) -0.061 (-0.40)  
6−∆ iP  0.241 (1.79) -0.073 (-0.49)  
7−∆ iP  0.273 (2.14) 0.182 (1.24)  
8−∆ iP  0.257 (2.20) 0.268 (1.81)  
9−∆ iP  0.214 (1.95) 0.391 (2.65)  
10−∆ iP  0.134 (1.27) 0.167 (1.10)  
11−∆ iP  0.215 (2.30) -0.093 (-0.58)  
12−∆ iP  0.059 (0.73) -0.242 (-1.78)  
T 182 89  
2Radj −  0.823 0.995  
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months, this gives four independent observations per year.  For my dataset of heating oil, 
this procedure produces about 86 independent observations.     
 Five alternative models for choosing hedge ratios are considered to evaluate how 
well a long-term exposure to asset prices can be hedged using a stacked hedge.  The first 
model follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.   The second model extends the first model 
by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield.  The third model extends 
the first model by allowing for both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. 
The fourth model uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path.  The last 
model is known as the naïve strategy apparently used by MGRM.   
3.4.1 The Hedging Portfolio 
  Hedging portfolios are formed assuming that a unit flow of the asset is to be 
hedged at the end of each of the next three periods, e.g. one barrel of crude oil is to be 
bought at the end of each period.  The strip hedge is used as a benchmark.  With the strip 
hedge, three units of flow are purchased in the futures market with contracts of length 
one, two, and three periods.  Each contract is for one unit of product.  Thus, under price 
convergence, future cash flows are completely determined.  The hedge error (HE) for 
model i is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage cumulative future 






bi −=  









HP −=   
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  Table 3.7 presents the three-period hedging performance for heating oil.  The 
volatility of the percentage difference in cash flows between the unhedged position and 
the strip hedge portfolio equals 7.4185%.  Model 1 requires a total trading of 5.9571 
units.  Under this model, 80.76% of the spot price risk is reduced.  Model 2 performs 
slightly worse.  The risk reduction is 79.64%.  This strategy requires an overall trading of 
5.9788 units.  Model 3 needs much less trading (4.8857 units are traded) and has the best 
performance with a 92.15% reduction.  Model 4 has a risk reduction of 81.38% and the 
overall position to be initiated is 5.8551 units.  Model 5 requires the most intensive 
trading and has the lowest hedging performance.  Overall, Model 3 performs best as it 
requires the smallest position, and has the lowest standard deviation of hedging error.         
 Table 3.8 displays the hedging performance for light crude oil.  Each of the five 
models has comparable trading positions and similar hedge performances.  The average 
hedge performance of the models is 0.9576.  Model 3 has the smallest standard deviation 
of hedge errors. Table 3.9 provides similar implications.  Model 3 has the best 
performance and requires minimum hedging positions.  The mean of hedge performances 
for the five models equals 0.9651.         
 Table 3.10 reports the hedging effectiveness for the British Pound. The five 
models show a nearly perfect hedge.  The risk reduction ranges from 0.9783 to 0.9815.  
The average risk reduction of the five models is approximately 98 percent.  In addition, 
the hedge positions across these models do not differ significantly.       
 Table 3.11 reports the hedging performance for the Deutsche Mark.  The results 
are similar to but than better those for the British Pound.  All of the five models have 
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Table 3.7 
Comparison of Three-Period Hedging Performance for Heating Oil 
 




Unhedged 1 2 3 4 5 Strip 
Hedge 
1 0 2.9684 2.9841 2.1869 2.9276 3 3 
2 0 1.9888 1.9947 1.6988 1.9517 2 0 
3 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9759 1 0 
Gross Position 0 5.9571 5.9788 4.8857 5.8551 6 3 
SD of HE (%) 7.4185 3.2538 3.3471 2.0509 3.2015 3.3816 0 
HP 0 0.8076 0.7964 0.9215 0.8138 0.7922 1 
No. of Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86  86 
 The stack hedge consists of a single one-period contract that is rolled every period.  Model 1 follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield. Model 3 extends Model 1 by allowing for 
both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. Model 4 uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path. Model 5 
is known as the naïve strategy used by MGRM.  The strip hedge uses one-, two-, and three-period contracts simultaneously.   
 The hedge is executed from November 1979 to May 2001. I assume that the supply flow commitment of one unit of commodity 
per period occurs.  For each strategy the average positions in futures contracts, the Standard Deviation of the Hedge Error (SD of HE), 
and Hedging Performance (HP) are reported. The hedge error is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage 
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Table 3.8 
Comparison of Three-Period Hedging Performance for Light Crude Oil 
 




Unhedged 1 2 3 4 5 Strip 
Hedge 
1 0 2.9777 2.9870 2.8222 2.9029 3 3 
2 0 1.9922 1.9957 1.9395 1.9353 2 0 
3 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9676 1 0 
Gross Position 0 5.9700 5.9827 5.7617 5.8059 6 3 
SD of HE (%) 8.0781 1.5614 1.7917 1.5053 1.6122 1.8216 0 
HP 0 0.9626 0.9508 0.9653 0.9602 0.9492 1 
No. of Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70  70 
 The stack hedge consists of a single one-period contract that is rolled every period.  Model 1 follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield. Model 3 extends Model 1 by allowing for 
both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. Model 4 uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path. Model 5 
is known as the naïve strategy used by MGRM.  The strip hedge uses one-, two-, and three-period contracts simultaneously.   
 The hedge is executed from November 1983 to May 2001.  I assume that the supply flow commitment of one unit of commodity 
per period occurs.  For each strategy the average positions in futures contracts, the Standard Deviation of the Hedge Error (SD of HE), 
and Hedging Performance (HP) are reported. The hedge error is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage 
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Table 3.9 
Comparison of Three-Period Hedging Performance for Unleaded Gasoline 
 




Unhedged 1 2 3 4 5 Strip 
Hedge 
1 0 2.9920 2.9872 2.5235 2.9276 3 3 
2 0 1.9963 1.9957 1.8317 1.9517 2 0 
3 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9759 1 0 
Gross Position 0 5.9883 5.9830 5.3551 5.8552 6 3 
SD of HE (%) 9.5405 1.7832 1.9349 1.3819 1.9775 0 0 
HP 0 0.9651 0.9589 0.9790 0.9655 0.9570 1 
No. of Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
 The stack hedge consists of a single one-period contract that is rolled every period.  Model 1 follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield. Model 3 extends Model 1 by allowing for 
both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. Model 4 uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path. Model 5 
is known as the naïve strategy used by MGRM.  The strip hedge uses one-, two-, and three-period contracts simultaneously.   
 The hedge is executed from January 1985 to April 2001. I assume that the supply flow commitment of one unit of commodity per 
period occurs.  For each strategy the average positions in futures contracts, the Standard Deviation of the Hedge Error (SD of HE), and 
Hedging Performance (HP) are reported. The hedge error is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage cumulative 
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Table 3.10 
Comparison of Three-Period Hedging Performance for the British Pound 
 




Unhedged 1 2 3 4 5 Strip 
Hedge 
1 0 2.9343 2.8661 2.8263 2.9227 3 3 
2 0 1.9779 1.9835 1.9411 1.9484 2 0 
3 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9742 1 0 
Gross Position 0 5.9122 5.8496 5.7674 5.8453 6 3 
SD of HE (%) 4.2493 0.5774 0.5901 0.6259 0.5773 0.5931 0 
HP 0 0.9815 0.9807 0.9783 0.9815 0.9805 1 
No. of Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34  34 
 The stack hedge consists of a single one-period contract that is rolled every period.  Model 1 follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield. Model 3 extends Model 1 by allowing for 
both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. Model 4 uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path. Model 5 
is known as the naïve strategy used by MGRM.  The strip hedge uses one-, two-, and three-period contracts simultaneously.   
 The hedge is executed from December 1975 to June 2001. I assume that the supply flow commitment of one unit of commodity 
per period occurs.  For each strategy the average positions in futures contracts, the Standard Deviation of the Hedge Error (SD of HE), 
and Hedging Performance (HP) are reported. The hedge error is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage 
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Table 3.11 
Comparison of Three-Period Hedging Performance for the Deutsche Mark 
 




Unhedged 1 2 3 4 5 Strip 
Hedge 
1 0 2.9650 3.0301 2.9179 2.9484 3 3 
2 0 1.9883 1.9836 1.9720 1.9656 2 0 
3 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9828 1 0 
Gross Position 0 5.9533 6.0136 5.8899 5.8969 6 3 
SD of HE (%) 4.5127 0.2732 0.3037 0.3531 0.2708 0.3319 0 
HP 0 0.9963 0.9955 0.9939 0.9964 0.9946 1 
No. of Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32  32 
 The stack hedge consists of a single one-period contract that is rolled every period.  Model 1 follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield. Model 3 extends Model 1 by allowing for 
both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. Model 4 uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path. Model 5 
is known as the naïve strategy used by MGRM.  The strip hedge uses one-, two-, and three-period contracts simultaneously.   
 The hedge is executed from November 1979 to May 2001. I assume that the supply flow commitment of one unit of commodity 
per period occurs.  For each strategy the average positions in futures contracts, the Standard Deviation of the Hedge Error (SD of HE), 
and Hedging Performance (HP) are reported. The hedge error is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage 








HP −=   
 98    
nearly perfect performance – the hedge performance, on average, is higher than 0.99.  
Table 3.12 provides additional and stronger evidence that stacked hedges with investment 
assets perform nearly as well as strip hedges.    
 Table 3.13 demonstrates the relation between average deviation from the cost-of- 
carry (CC) model and hedging performance (HP) for three commercial commodities and 
three investment assets.  The commercial commodities are heating oil, light crude oil, and 
unleaded gasoline.  The investment assets include the British Pound, the Deutsche Mark, 























































 I report hedge performance for each of the five stacked hedge models.  The 
evidence suggests that stacked hedges perform better with investment assets than with 
commercial commodities.  The investment assets have better hedge performance: 0.9805 
for the British Pound, 0.9953 for the Deutsche Mark, and 0.9937 for the Swiss Franc.  
The commercial commodities have lower hedge performance. The mean hedge 
performance for commercial commodities range from 0.8263 for heating oil to 0.9651 for 
unleaded gasoline.  
 My analysis indicates that the average deviation from the cost-of-carry model for 
commercial commodities is higher than the corresponding measure for investments 
assets.  The average deviation from cost of carry for heating oil is 23.1504 percent, which 
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Table 3.12 
Comparison of Three-Period Hedging Performance for the Swiss Franc 
 




Unhedged 1 2 3 4 5 Strip 
Hedge 
1 0 2.9769 3.0984 2.9899 2.9227 3 3 
2 0 1.9923 1.9835 1.9968 1.9484 2 0 
3 0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9742 1 0 
Gross Position 0 5.9692 6.0819 5.9867 5.8453 6 3 
SD of HE (%) 4.5562 0.3376 0.3817  0.3937 0.3219 0.3631 0 
HP 0 0.9945 0.9930 0.9925 0.9950 0.9936 1 
No. of Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34  34 
 The stack hedge consists of a single one-period contract that is rolled every period.  Model 1 follows from Hilliard’s (1999) setup.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for variable instantaneous net convenience yield. Model 3 extends Model 1 by allowing for 
both interest rates and convenience yields to be stochastic. Model 4 uses time-series regression to derive the new hedge path. Model 5 
is known as the naïve strategy used by MGRM.  The strip hedge uses one-, two-, and three-period contracts simultaneously.   
 The hedge is executed from December 1975 to June 2001. I assume that the supply flow commitment of one unit of commodity 
per period occurs.  For each strategy the average positions in futures contracts, the Standard Deviation of the Hedge Error (SD of HE), 
and Hedging Performance (HP) are reported. The hedge error is defined as the absolute value of the difference in percentage 
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Table 3.13 
Average Deviation from the CC Model and Hedge Performance 
 
   Stacked Hedge Model  
Assets β 
Average 
Deviation (%) 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean of 
HP 
Commercial Commodity     
   Heating Oil 0.7402 23.1504 0.8076 0.7964 0.9215 0.8138 0.7922 0.8263 
   Light Crude Oil 0.9442   4.7492 0.9626 0.9508 0.9653 0.9602 0.9492 0.9576 
   Unleaded Gasoline 0.8358 14.5539 0.9651 0.9589 0.9790 0.9655 0.9570 0.9651 
         
Investment Asset     
   British Pound 0.9578 3.7139 0.9815 0.9807 0.9783 0.9815 0.9805 0.9805 
   Deutsche Mark 0.9904 1.6163 0.9963 0.9955 0.9939 0.9964 0.9946 0.9953 
   Swiss Franc  1.0145 0.8255 0.9945 0.9930 0.9925 0.9950 0.9936 0.9937 
 
 
This table reports β, Hedge Performance (HP), and the mean deviation )(d  from the cost-of-carry (CC) model for three 
commercial commodities and three investment assets.  The commercial commodities are heating oil, light crude oil, and 
unleaded gasoline.  The investment assets include British Pound, Deutsche Mark, and Swiss Franc.  β is the estimated 
parameter from Model 3. Mean Deviation from CC is the average deviation of futures prices from that predicted by the 
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Table 3.14 
Hedge Error and Average Deviation from the CC Model 
 
.: * ttt dHEModel ελα ++=  
Assets T α        t(α) λ        t(λ ) 
Heating Oil 86 0.009 2.574* 0.097 3.679* 
Light Crude Oil 70 0.003      1.908 0.010 8.481* 
Unleaded Gasoline 65 0.011 4.833* 0.091 2.437* 
British Pound 34 0.004 3.019* 0.014      0.395 
Deutsche Mark 32 0.003 4.222* 0.035      0.520 
Swiss Franc 34 0.004 4.019* 0.028      0.522 
 
T is the number of observations.  t(α)  is the ratio of the OLS estimates of α to its standard 
error.  The value of t(α) denoted by an (*) are smaller than the 5% one tail critical value of the 
distribution of t(α ).  
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is followed by 14.5539 percent for unleaded gasoline, 4.7492 percent for light crude oil, 3.7139 
percent for the British Pound, 1.6163 percent for the Deutsche Mark, and 0.8255percent for the 
Swiss Franc. 
  To formally test my hypothesis that the significant differences in hedging performance 
between commercial commodities and investment assets are attributed to the stochastic nature of 
instantaneous net convenience yields, I test the regression model as follows: 
  (34) ttt dHE ελα ++=












==−= T is the number of hedging observations. 
   
The null hypothesis is 0H : λ 0≤ .  If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that assets with high convenience yields yield larger hedge errors in the multi-period 
stacked hedge.   
  As can been see from inspection of Table 3.14, the estimated values of λ for heating oil, 
light crude oil, and unleaded gasoline are positive and statistically different from zero.  This 
evidence is consistent with my hypothesis that a stochastic representation of instantaneous net 
convenience yields results in pronounced deviations from the theoretical spot-futures parity 
resulting in non-trivial hedge errors.  Since investment assets have little or no convenience yields 
while commercial commodities have non-trivial convenience yields, stacked hedges perform 
better with investment assets than with commercial commodities.  However, the estimated values 
of λ for the British Pound, Deutsche Mark, and Swiss Franc are not statistically different from 
zero. A possible explanation of these results is that investment assets have little or no 
convenience yields so that they do not retain sufficient time-serial variation in the deviation term, 
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which is predicted to be positively related to hedge error.  Caution is also needed in interpreting 
the estimated values of λ for the Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc because their series of {HEt} 
and {dt} are integrated of different orders.  These results suggest that their residual sequences in 
the regression model contain a stochastic trend and thus those estimated values of λ are not 
consistent.            
3.5   Conclusions 
 The strip hedge strategy provides a perfect hedge under price convergence.  However, 
there is not always sufficient volume and liquidity in distant contracts to make the strip hedge 
economically feasible. This chapter compares different versions of the stacked hedge with the 
strip hedge. Empirical evidence suggests that stacked hedges perform better with investment 
assets than with commercial commodities.  For investment assets, the hedging performance of 
the stacked hedge approaches that of the strip hedge.  Empirical evidence shows that a stochastic 
representation of convenience yields result in pronounced deviations from the spot-futures parity 
resulting in non-trivial hedge errors.   
This study also sheds light on the MGRM controversy.  The press and the financial 
economics literature have discussed extensively the debacle of MGRM.  One of the main 
problems is that because MGRM was unable to meet maintenance margins, the tremendous 
paper losses became realized.  My study suggests that MGRM’s tremendous losses were also 
related to an ineffective hedging strategy.  Since most contracts tended to be of short maturity, 
MGRM hedged its long-term exposures to the prices of crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline by 
sequentially stacking nearby futures contracts until the end of its hedging horizon.  My results 
suggest that rolling short-term futures contracts exposes MGRM to substantial rollover risk.  
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In summary, the stacked hedge is effective when the spot-futures relationship depends on 
no additional state variables.  If other state variables are present, the stacked hedge can generally 
produce some risk reduction, but more effective strategies might require multiple contracts of 
different maturities as suggested by Neuberger (1999) and Schwartz (1997).   
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
  This dissertation contributes to the corporate hedging literature along two dimensions.  
First, it empirically analyzes the determinants of corporate use of linear and nonlinear hedging 
instruments.  Second, it evaluates how well long-term exposures to assets prices can be 
neutralized using a stacked hedge with applications to three commercial commodities and to 
three investment assets.      
It presents an exploratory study on why firms use linear or nonlinear derivative contracts.  
This study answers two main questions.  First, what induces firms to adopt nonlinear derivatives 
or linear securities?  Second, what determines the extent of linear and nonlinear hedging by 
corporations that undertake linear and nonlinear devices?  The results of cross-sectional 
regression using Tobit and Probit models indicate that the determinants that motivate firms to use 
linear and nonlinear derivative instruments significant affect the extent to which firms use linear 
and nonlinear derivative vehicles.  Overall, my evidence is consistent with the previous studies 
that both value maximization and personal incentives affect corporate hedging policy.         
I find several interesting results that support the shareholder-value-maximization 
paradigm.  First, I document that nonlinear derivative usage is positively related to investment 
opportunity.  This finding suggests that firms with greater investment opportunities use nonlinear 
devices to reduce downside risk but also preserve positive gains derived from the enhanced 
investment opportunity sets.  Second, the use of nonlinear derivatives increases with firm size.  
This evidence is consistent with the notion that larger corporations have more resources to invest 
in sophisticated systems and personnel required to manage more complex nonlinear derivatives.  
Third, free cash flow is positive related with the notional values of both linear and nonlinear 
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contracts and the proportion of nonlinear derivative contracts in the hedge portfolio.  These 
results suggest that internal cash allows firms to use nonlinear derivatives to maintain upside 
potential for shareholders without incurring the higher costs of external financing.   Finally, I 
find a positive relation between the use of nonlinear hedging and the prospect of financial 
distress, measured as leverage, industry-adjusted leverage, Z-score, and coverage ratio.  This 
evidence suggests that firms facing the prospect of financial distress attempt to mitigate the 
underinvestment problem by using derivatives that can maintain upside potential for 
shareholders.  The absence of a negative relation between the use of a nonlinear strategy and 
convertible debt lends no support to the hypothesis that firms use nonlinear contracts at the 
expense of debtholders.   
Additionally, I document results that are consistent with the agency theory.  I find a 
positive relation between the use of nonlinear mechanism and stock option awards, but a 
negative relation between bonus plans and nonlinear usage.  The positive relation with stock 
option awards suggests that managers who receive more compensation from stock options have 
greater incentives to implement a nonlinear strategy to raise the value of their stock options.  The 
negative relation with bonus plans suggests that managers are less likely to use nonlinear 
financial instruments when his bonus payments are at or near the cap.  Overall, these findings 
suggest that the incentive compensation structure affects the hedging decision. Inefficient 
contracts lead to inefficient policies.  I find a negative relation between CEO tenure and the use 
of nonlinear hedging.  This result suggests that managerial risk aversion or management’s lack of 
familiarity with sophisticated derivatives reduces nonlinear usage.   
This dissertation also sheds light on the effectiveness of stacked hedges, which 
Metallgesellsahft Refining & Marketing (MGRM) used to manage its exposures to oil prices.    
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Empirical evidence indicates that stacked hedges perform better with investment assets than with 
commercial commodities.  For investment assets, the hedging performance of stacked hedge 
approaches that of strip hedge.  The stacked hedge produces R2 of at least 0.98 for investment 
assets while it produces R2 of less than 0.83 for heating oil.  These results are consistent with my 
hypothesis that two classes of assets are attributed to the stochastic nature of marginal 
convenience yields of commercial commodities.   
My results provide some implications for the MGRM controversy.  One of the main 
problems is that because MGRM was unable to meet maintenance margins, the tremendous 
paper losses in derivative contracts became realized.  My evidence suggests that MGRM’s losses 
were also related to an ineffective hedging strategy.   If MGRM had implemented a strip hedge, 
it would have had no exposures to oil prices.  Instead, it sequentially stacked nearby futures 
contracts until the end of the hedging problem to insulate the profit margins in its fixed-price 
commitment from its exposure to spot price increases.  Rolling short-term futures contracts 
exposed MGRM to substantial roller risk.                
  In summary, this dissertation provides evidence that value maximization and managerial 
incentives motivate the use of linear and nonlinear derivatives by corporations.  It also presents 
evidence that the stacked hedge is effective when hedges assets obey the spot-futures parity.  If 
other state variables such as convenience yields are present, the stacked hedge can generally 
reduce some risks, but more effective strategies require a strip of derivative contracts 
corresponding to the maturity of a delivery date.        
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